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THESIS

**POLITICAL SOLDIERS AND DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

by

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September 2006

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**POLITICAL SOLDIERS AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION-BUILDING IN
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

This thesis seeks to identify if, in the course of the United States' and NATO's democratic institution-building efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the United States and NATO are offering a viable model of how military professionals interact with a healthy democratic society. Because the understanding of how military professionals should interact with society as a whole is often flawed in the United States and other developed democratic states, this study will research how well the United States and NATO are presenting a realistic model to professional soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This study begins with a broad look at civil-military relations theory and examines select historical examples of professional soldiers exceeding their purview in developed countries such as the United States and Britain. The Yugoslav People's Army's political history is surveyed to examine the political involvement of professional soldiers in politics in the former state of Yugoslavia. Lastly, this study will examine contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina and the West's democratic institution-building efforts.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION-BUILDING AND THE POLITICAL SOLDIER

1. Primary Question

This thesis will seek to answer the following question: In the course of the United States' and NATO's democratic institution-building efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, does the United States and NATO offer a realistic model of how military professionals should interact politically within a healthy democratic society?

Within American society there is great confusion regarding appropriate and inappropriate political involvement by our professional soldiers. Civil military theorists differ about what constitutes ideal political involvement by professional soldiers in a democracy. Samuel Huntington regards a soldier's absence from the political realm to be the hallmark of their professionalism, especially in societies that face few existential threats.¹ Janowitz differs with him by saying that military professionals are by their nature political because of their responsibilities within a democratic society.² S.E. Finer's four levels of political involvement by the military provide a more nuanced perspective by which the military's political involvement in a society can be judged to be healthy. If limited to "influence," a military can positively interact with society through the press and through congressional lobbying.³

An accurate understanding of the political nature of professional soldiers is important so efforts to better educate our military professionals can be undertaken and so democratic societies can recognize unhealthy behavior when it occurs. This will also improve security sector reform efforts in new

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State – The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 97.

² Morris Janowitz, *Professional Soldier* (The Free Press: New York, 1960), 12.

³ Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 9. Finer's four levels are: influence, blackmail, displacement, and supplantation.

democracies by providing military and civilian authorities with a durable and realistic model of democratic civil-military relations.

a. *Are Political Skills Useful to Professional Soldiers in Democratic States?*

Once free of the myth that professional soldiers can exist in isolation from politics in a democratic society, it is easy to see that politically astute soldiers can greatly benefit their institution and foster a more healthy democratic civil-military relationship. Soldiers that recognize their constitutional relationship with the society as a whole and who understand the appropriate political channels in which to interact with that society are less likely to violate proper professional ethics and norms in their pursuit of their professional duties. Additionally, politically astute and disciplined military leaders are better able to craft appropriate plans for their civilian leadership when they understand the greater context of their military plans in times of both war and peace.

Professional soldiers run afoul of democratic norms when they fail to grasp the greater political, social, and cultural context of the military planning and operations. Military leaders often perpetuate a false premise that operations or tactics can be neatly separated from the political realm. In the 1860s, Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder) strove to establish boundaries in the 1860s that political leadership should not violate.⁴ Gen. Douglas MacArthur made his efforts in the 1950s,⁵ and most recently military retirees in the United States made assertions that the secretary of Defense had overstepped his authority by overruling “years of military planning” in the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom.⁶

The last two examples serve as glaring reminders that military professionals who fail to grasp their proper role in a democratic society have failed in their responsibilities to that society. Military leaders should never allow

⁴ Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* (New York: The Oxford University Press, 1955), 188.

⁵ Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron – Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (New York: University of Cambridge Press, 1998), 331-333.

⁶ John Batiste (Maj. Gen (ret.), U.S. Army), interview with Bob Shieffer, Washington, D.C., April 23, 2006 and John Batiste (Maj. Gen. (ret.), U.S. Army), interview with Harry Smith, New York, April 12, 2006.

their disagreements with civilian leaders' judgments to skew their understanding of the important role they serve as military professionals in a democratic society.

b. *What Historical Examples Exist in Yugoslavia's Past that can be Used to Illustrate Constructive and Positive Political Involvement by the Military?*

Understanding that Yugoslavia was a communist state and that civil-military relations in a democracy is an entirely different affair than that which existed in communist countries, there are historical examples of professionalism and respect for constitutional law that one can glean from the Yugoslav People's Army political history. There were some surprising precedents set during the Yugoslav state's history that were not seen anywhere else in communist Europe.⁷ After Tito's death we find more examples of senior military leadership defending the constitution against nationalist demagogues such as Slobodan Milošević.

Yugoslavia's history is also replete with examples of poor professional behavior by its military professionals. During the Yugoslav crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the senior military leadership missed opportunities that could have cooled tensions between the republics; however, the military's misguided and ham-fisted attempts to influence political decisions outside of its purview perpetuated the conflict at its most critical time.⁸

Because of its multi-ethnic nature, the Yugoslav People's Army's (YPA) history has other valuable lessons for today's Bosnian military. The YPA sought to serve as a truly pan-Yugoslav organization and took measures to ensure its various ethnic groups were adequately represented among its ranks.⁹

⁷ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 48. One example of this exceptionalism is that military budgets were actually questioned by republican authorities during the 1960s when nationalist sentiments and a desire for butter versus guns prompted pressure on the military to defend its budgets.

⁸ Ibid., 140. General Veljko Kadijević served as the Federal Secretary for National Defense during the Yugoslav crisis and endorsed a new political party that re-affirmed communist ideals and opposed the Federal Prime Minister's efforts to reform the economy and attract foreign investment. This political foray by the military into an area so clearly outside of its area of expertise served to affirm republican fears of an overly political military.

⁹ A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1978), 20.

Its political blundering on matters of ethnicity served to exacerbate tensions in Slovenia in the early 1990s, which led to the secession of Slovenia from Yugoslavia.¹⁰

c. *What Improvements can be Made to Help the Bosnian Military Professionals to Develop Healthy Political Skills?*

Since the Dayton Accords were signed in 1995 there has been a deep involvement by Western democracies in the development of Bosnia's institutions, especially its military establishment. These efforts have gained momentum since 2003, as international patience with slow progress reached its nadir and as Bosnian foreign-policy goals changed to include aspirations for NATO and European Union membership.¹¹

Security sector reform has come very far and some structural flaws enshrined in Dayton have been overcome.¹² Political reform is desperately needed to complete Bosnia-Herzegovina's transition to a viable democratic state.

Political activity by the military can be healthy and tolerable under the right conditions. Democratic norms, practices, and institutions are critical to keep the military's involvement at a proper level.¹³ Without these norms and institutions, the symbiotic relationship between the military and the society it serves can become dysfunctional.

¹⁰ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 78-88. The case involved the prosecution of a Slovenian serviceman who had leaked information to a Slovenian nationalist publication. This incident is covered more thoroughly in Chapter III.

¹¹ In Lieutenant General Podžić's closing comments at a seminar for Bosnia's general officers on January 25, 2006 he stated that the military's most important mission is to gain membership in PfP and eventually gain full membership in NATO. This reflected a decision by the Tri-Presidency that Bosnia should make itself a viable candidate for full NATO membership, rather than confining itself to membership in just PfP. See also *AFBIH: A Single Military Force for the 21st Century – Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report*. Sarajevo: n.p., September 2005, 181.

¹² Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 362. "The most serious flaw in the Dayton Peace Accords was that it left two opposing armies in on country, one for Serbs and one for the Croat-Muslim Federation."

¹³ Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 19. "[W]hat limits the impact of their intervention is not that the army is inherently apolitical – because it is not – but the political culture within which the army is operating."

We will see that Bosnia's military leadership has enthusiastically embraced reform and democratic ideals. Their further development, however, is limited by the political atmosphere in which they operate.

B. SOURCES AND METHODS

Chapter II provides an examination of civil-military theory, as well as selected historical examples of political involvement by the military. It focuses on civil-military tensions during periods of war and peace. Through a multitude of examples it seeks to illuminate both healthy and unhealthy political involvement by military professionals.

Chapter III is a historical examination of the Yugoslav People's Army and its political involvement from 1941–1991. It includes a case study of General Veljko Kadijević who served as the Federal Secretary for National Defense from 1988-1991. His successes and failures serve as examples of the serious impact professional soldiers can have on the health of their polity, and ultimately their society.

Chapter IV is an examination of contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina and its democratic structures' development. I focus on security sector reform, but I also examine the impact that retarded political development can have on the sustainability of healthy civil-military relations. The research for this chapter included a trip to Sarajevo funded by the Naval Postgraduate School's Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR). The trip afforded me opportunities to interview senior Department of Defense officials, as well as retired military officers from both the United States and Britain who have been heavily involved in security sector reform in Bosnia for more than 10 years.

Chapter V offers some broad observations regarding Bosnia's security sector reform some recommendations for more effective democratic institution building in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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II. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY AND THE POLITICAL SOLDIER

A. THE MYTH OF THE APOLITICAL PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER

1. Introduction

In the late 1950s Samuel Huntington, in *The Soldier and the State*, and Morris Janowitz, in *The Professional Soldier*, offered diametrically opposed theories regarding military professionalism and politicization. Huntington's model professes that the hallmark of a soldier is to be apolitical. Janowitz argued the opposite, that, the more professional soldiers become, the more they would become involved in democratic politics. Both works were produced during the deep Cold War when America was grappling with the ramifications of maintaining a large nuclear armed force in a time of peace. The problem of how to maintain civilian control of the military in a democracy is an important one but not one that is easily arrived at through the process of deductive reasoning¹⁴ for it is much too complex and contains too many caveats and grey areas to allow for conclusions to be drawn without the benefit of cross-cultural historical data.

An understanding of the political nature of professional soldiers is important, however, because it has broad implications for the development of professional militaries in newly democratic post-communist states and nascent democratic states in the Arab world. It also has significant implications in the United States for its fight against terrorism when the potential exists for the military to exceed its bounds and the line between police functions and military functions becomes increasingly grey. It is important for the U.S. soldier-diplomat to understand the political nature of a professional force in order to maintain proper civilian control through the use of structures, norms, and procedures.

In our education efforts in post-communist societies it is important to portray a realistic model of civil-military relations to include frank assessments of

¹⁴ Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society* (Winter 1996): 14.

the political nature of professional soldiers as well as the appropriate institutions and procedures necessary to limit the political influence of the military.¹⁵

Samuel Huntington's assertions that professional soldiers are by definition apolitical does not stand up to scrutiny. Morris Janowitz was correct in his assessment of the professional and political soldier.¹⁶ Janowitz's complete model of civil-military relations is also flawed, but in other respects.¹⁷ It is useful to view military intervention through the prism of Samuel Finer's four levels of military intervention in politics to understand what is meant by the military's involvement in domestic politics. Judging whether or not a military establishment is political by simply looking at whether or not there has been a coup is surely not sufficient.¹⁸

Janowitz and Huntington may not have been realistic to ascribe political restraint to the internal mechanisms of a professional military, but it is useful when internal restraints on political activity are in place. Professional Military Education should stress the proper role of the military in the democratic political spectrum, fully outlining the *advantages* to civilian authority in the security policy realm. Additionally, military regulations should prohibit partisan activity that in any way compromises the neutrality of the military in partisan squabbles. With this in mind, we must understand that the professional soldier is a political being

¹⁵ Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback – The Role of the Military in Politics* (Pall Mall Press: London, 1962), 86. Influence is one of Finer's four levels of military involvement in politics. The others are blackmail, displacement and supplantation. Finer says the military engages in influence when it makes an "effort to convince the civil authorities by appealing to their reason or their emotions." He describes this activity as entirely appropriate.

¹⁶ Morris Janowitz, *Professional Soldier* (The Free Press: New York, 1960), 12. "The growth of the military establishment into a vast managerial enterprise with increased political responsibilities has produced a strain on traditional military self-images and concepts of honor.... As a result, the profession, especially within its strategic leadership, has developed a more explicit political ethos."

¹⁷ See Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society* (Winter 1996): 12. "In emphasizing the role of professionalism...both Huntington and Janowitz are vulnerable to charges of defining away the problem of civilian control. Both Janowitz and Huntington rely on internal mechanisms to ensure civilian control. Janowitz believes that, although professional soldiers are political, that same professionalism will ultimately also constrain their political involvement. In reality, mechanisms and procedures external to the military are necessary to ensure civilian control.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

who can well serve the polity while possessing a keen political sense that understands the military's proper role in society.

Most importantly, we have to recognize that civilian control of an organization with the authority to exercise force is a messy and complex process that requires constant vigilance in the enforcement of professional norms and appropriate behavior by civilians and military professionals alike. Military professionals who seek to use the cover of professional opinion to engage in partisan political activity harm both their institution and the polity just as surely as civilians who fail to sufficiently supervise and challenge their military subordinates.

2. Civilian Supremacy and Responsibility

Military professionals, civilian leaders and the populace at large must understand why it is the duty of the civilian leadership to be intimately involved in the arming, equipping, education and training of the armed forces in times of war and peace.¹⁹ It is crucial that the supremacy of civilian leadership be placed in the context of democratic politics. A policy that is honed in the fires of democratic debate and disagreement is more resilient than one made with purely military concerns in mind. Civilian leaders who are forced to justify policies to the electorate and to encompass a spectrum of concerns, not just security matters, will be eminently more qualified to make decisions than an expert in only defense matters. "Civilian competence, in the general sense, extends even beyond their competence in a particular sense...Although the expert may understand the issue better, the expert is not in a position to determine the value the people will attach to different issue outcomes. In the civil-military context, this means that the military may be best able to identify the threat and the appropriate response to that threat for a given level of risk, but only the civilian can set the appropriate level of risk for society."²⁰

¹⁹ Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command* (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 8.

²⁰ Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematic: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society* (Winter 1996): 14.

3. Targeting the Professional Soldier's Perception of Self and Politics

Military professionals who understand the true nature of democratic politics and democratic civil-military structures and procedures will be more politically astute, but paradoxically less likely to violate proper democratic values in the pursuit of their institution's interests. "All the available evidence underlines the conclusion that the officer's sense of professional frustration increases as one moves down the military hierarchy."²¹ It is surely no coincidence that junior officers fresh from officer training where the Huntington-inspired fiction of the apolitical officer is taught without reference to democratic politics feel a sense of frustration with politicians who they believe do not have the expertise to make judgments regarding security.

It is important for U.S. training programs in newly democratic states to stress the role of the soldier in politics in a democratic society so when problems arise between the professional military and democratically elected civilian leadership, as they surely will, they can be dealt with in the proper context.

Article 5 of the Law on Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina states that "the Armed Forces cannot be used for political purposes or political partisan activities."²² It is a given that military forces should not be used for partisan political activities, but to expect the military to remain politically inactive is not realistic. It is no surprise that this article appeared in the text of the Law on Defense in Bosnia and Herzegovina because for very practical purposes the strongest of stances had to be taken to ensure that the military was not engaging in partisan political activity. The fact that the measure mentions political purposes as well as partisan activity buttresses the contention that the apolitical soldier myth is alive and well in newly democratic states.

The juridical prohibition against political activity will surely prove unenforceable in the long term because defense policy development and the

²¹ Morris Janowitz, *Professional Soldier* (The Free Press: New York, 1960), 367.

²² AFBH: *A Single Military Force for the 21st Century – Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report*. Sarajevo: n.p., September 2005.

competition for resources in which the military establishment will engage are inherently political in nature in a democratic society.²³ “The military’s focus on equipping and training to win wars inevitably will conflict with the need for elected officials to serve the wider policies of the state.”²⁴ In the most desirable of circumstances, military professionals will use levers of influence at their disposal to cajole civilian policymakers into acquiescing to their priorities. In addition, “the military is involved in the political realm by influencing decisions made about the international balance of power and behavior of other states.”²⁵

It must be stressed that this political activity is not partisan in nature at least by no means should it be. “According to the definitions of military honor, the professional soldier is ‘above politics’...Under democratic theory, the ‘above politics’ formula requires that, in democratic politics, generals and admirals do not attach themselves to political parties or overtly display partisanship. Furthermore, military men are civil servants, so that elected leaders are assured of the military’s partisan neutrality.”²⁶

4. Janowitzian Reality

This idea is hardly groundbreaking, for although the U.S. military surely stresses the ideal of the apolitical soldier in its training²⁷ both domestically and overseas, the Janowitzian outlook has dominated the literature on the subject since the late 1950s. There is even some evidence in *The Soldier and the State* that Huntington would have agreed with Janowitz’s assertion that professional

²³ Andrew A. Michta, *The Soldier Citizen – The Politics of the Polish Army after Communism* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997) 7. “Like any bureaucratized state institution, the military seeks to maximize its political power and influence regardless of the political system in which it functions.”

²⁴ Thomas Durell Young, “Military Professionalism in a Democracy,” in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, eds. Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2006), 23.

²⁵ Morris Janowitz, *Professional Soldier* (The Free Press: New York, 1960), 12.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 233.

²⁷ Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces and Society* (Winter 1996), 6.

militaries are political. At times, their differences seem to lie in semantics.²⁸ Viewed through this spectrum, it is possible that Janowitz and Huntington were speaking past each other. Whereas Huntington was speaking to actual military intervention in politics when the military oversteps its bounds by subverting the democratic institutions Janowitz sought to illuminate a more subtle view of the political spectrum and a professional military's tendency to influence political decisions.²⁹

The soldier exercises political skills in times of both peace and war. In peaceful times, the professional soldier will aid in the formation of strategy and allocation of defense resources, including procurement and advisement of what is militarily possible with regard to civilian priorities. During conflict, the soldier will aid the civilians in setting strategic priorities as well, but will also take a more active role in the prosecution of hostilities. In both these cases, military professionals exercise political influence as an interest group.

On the strategic level, when military professionals clash with their civilian superiors about the proper course to take it does not signify a bad civilian-military relationship. It can, in fact, be the best one can hope for.

a. Professional Disagreement and the Inter-agency Process

The military chiefs in 1941 were recommending the concentration of forces in the Atlantic and limited provocation with Japan in anticipation of hostilities with Germany. They were employing the military principle of

²⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State – The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 88. When discussing the influence of the officer corps, he discusses how “officers may develop inservice affiliations in the course of their military duties, as for example, special ties with congressional committees, or with those industries whose products are consumed by the armed forces.” He later states that “These...factors will help give some index of the political influence of the military.” Janowitz would say they were displaying political tendencies but Huntington uses the phrase “political influence.” It is possible that Huntington understood the political nature of the military establishment and clearly meant “apolitical” to mean not engaging in partisan behavior.

²⁹ Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 10.

“concentration of force” to the political realm,³⁰ but Franklin Delano Roosevelt felt they were ignoring political realities. “The military and civilian viewpoints were each correct from their individual perspectives.” Roosevelt believed that a soft policy toward Japan was less risky than a hard policy and that provocation of Germany could have destroyed the domestic support for an anti-Axis policy.³¹ Counter-factualism is popular. Indeed, many say that Roosevelt’s judgment was flawed and that the Pearl Harbor attack was the result, but the important point is that Roosevelt considered the military aspect as represented by the JCS and made the decision based on all factors, not just those of the military situation. This is the best one can hope for.

b. Unavoidably Political

If there is an exemplar of a professional soldier whose behavior displayed a healthy respect for democratic civil-military relations, it is General George C. Marshall. He best represents the embodiment of loyalty to his civilian superiors, and is quoted as saying, “We are completely devoted, we are a member of the priesthood really, the sole purpose of which is to defend the republic.”³² Yet this is the same man who defied one of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s explicit orders in July 1942. Marshall disagreed with Roosevelt’s veto of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Pacific first strategy when Roosevelt ordered the JCS to agree to a North African landing. Against Roosevelt’s intent, Marshall continued to pursue a *de facto* Pacific first strategy with limited success.³³ This demonstrates that no military professional of high rank can avoid being sullied in the political arena. He believed a Pacific first strategy was the proper course in the defense of his nation, yet his instincts surely tugged at his conscience as he obliquely disobeyed his superior.

³⁰ Mark A. Stoller, *Allies and Adversaries – The Joint Chiefs, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 62.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 62.

³² Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command* (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 205.

³³ Mark A. Stoller, *Allies and Adversaries – The Joint Chiefs, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 87.

c. *Inter-service Rivalry and a Competition for Resources*

Politics practiced by the military very often take the shape of inter-service rivalry manifested in recommendations to civilian superiors and leaks to the press concerning strategy and procurement. These recommendations have real consequences in terms of allocation of resources and can potentially impact the successful defense of the nation. Therefore, can the military not possibly escape the realm of politics especially when these debates are made public?

Prior to World War II the Navy argued for a larger presence in the Pacific, and by consequence favored more diplomatic pressure on Japan, which would therefore have political ramifications. The Army favored a withdrawal from bases in the Pacific because of their remote nature and indefensibility.³⁴ The Navy still believed in Alfred Mahan's concept of national greatness and thought the Pacific was the future for American greatness. "Any challenge to those concepts threatened not simply the navy's strategy but also the very worldview, status, and jobs of its officers."³⁵ The Army's opposition to these far flung bases rested on the realities of resource scarcity and a lack of national will. The Army sought to avoid confrontation with Japan and a war that the American people would not support.³⁶

d. *The Advantages of a Politically Astute Military Professional*

After December 7, 1941 many of the inter-service rivalries dissipated, but new disputes between the military chiefs and the civilian leadership became more intense. As the chiefs argued their case they were exerting political influence and the country was better served by their savvy political skills. After being told by Marshall his rationale for objecting to British strategy, Acheson concluded that "when Marshall thought about military

³⁴ Mark A. Stoller, *Allies and Adversaries – The Joint Chiefs, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 6.

³⁵ Ibid., 7.

³⁶ Ibid., 6.

problems, ‘nonmilitary factors played a controlling part.’”³⁷ Marshall had taken into consideration typically political factors such as public opinion. This sort of calculus by the military will help it shape plans that are more realistic, therefore, it will be more likely to preserve harmony between the military and its civilian superiors.

e. Use of the Media

Often the military exerts influence on the political landscape through the media. Senior British military officers have a long tradition of enlisting sympathetic journalists in their campaigns against civilian authority. Kitchener used his contacts³⁸ to ensure his opinions appeared in the papers on the same day the Imperial Defence Committee would meet for confidential discussion.³⁹ Wolseley had criticized Prime Minister Salisbury’s budget of the Army and Navy at a dinner and the remarks were later published in the *Telegraph*.⁴⁰

Public military opposition to civilian policies also manifested itself in the United States Army prior to World War II. Major General Embick advocated a continentalist military policy prior to World War II but his recommendations were rejected. He then went public with his objections by associating with Frederick J. Libby’s National Council for the Prevention of War and by supporting the Ludlow Amendment.⁴¹

Up until the contentious war in Iraq, public stands by military officers on political matters may have appeared strange, but the influence was exerted nonetheless. Reporters in the Washington, D.C., area have had contact

³⁷ Mark A. Stoller, *Allies and Adversaries – The Joint Chiefs, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 270.

³⁸ Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 105. Charles à Court Repington of the *Standard* has served with on Kitchener’s staff in Egypt.

³⁹ Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 105.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁴¹ Mark A. Stoller, *Allies and Adversaries – The Joint Chiefs, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 13. The Ludlow Amendment would have required a national referendum for the nation to enter into a war.

with hundreds of professional military officers who were more than happy to offer their opinions, provide leaks, or report on policy proceedings. These unnamed sources are merely following in Wolseley's and Kitchener's tradition.⁴²

Recently, when several retired general officers called on the Secretary of Defense to resign, their aggressive use of the print and television media to push their agenda took the normally subtle use of the media to a new level for military professionals. This has not been seen in the United States for at least a generation.

5. Temptation for Blackmail

When a military professional's star is especially bright, the playing field between the military professional and his civilian superior can become lopsided. In these cases, the temptation for blackmail⁴³ can prove irresistible.

a. Kitchener in India (1902–1905)

When Lord Kitchener arrived in India to take up post as commander-in-chief he was determined to use his military prestige to dominate the political as well as the military realm. He was even quoted as saying he intended to use his popularity to dominate the civilian leadership on the subcontinent.⁴⁴ Kitchener bristled at the thought that his authority would be curtailed financially by a junior officer who an ordinary member of the Council of India when he was just an extraordinary member.⁴⁵ This system had been recommended by the Hartington report⁴⁶ in the spirit of integrated control with

⁴² Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 99. "The *Daily Telegraph* had referred to Wolseley not by name but as the 'highest military authority.'"

⁴³ Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback – The Role of the Military in Politics* (Pall Mall Press: London, 1962), 86. "The second level is pressures, or blackmail. Here the military seek to convince the civil power by the threat of some sanction.... It can range from hints or actions that are just barely constitutional at one end to intimidation and threats that are clearly unconstitutional on the other."

⁴⁴ Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 104.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 104-5.

⁴⁶ Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 120.

only the supply and finance of the Army outside of the commander-in-chief's purview. Kitchener wanted to consolidate these responsibilities into one man – himself.

The conservative Balfour government in Britain was extremely vulnerable between the years 1903–1905 and could not afford a public break with the Hero of Omdurman,⁴⁷ so he was able to blackmail the government in his battles with the Curzon, the Viceroy of India. Once it became apparent that London would sooner acquiesce to Curzon's departure than confront Kitchener, Curzon resigned and all military administration was consolidated under the commander-in-chief in India.

b. *MacArthur in Korea (1950–1951)*

Gen. Douglas MacArthur famously blackmailed President Harry S. Truman during his prosecution of the war from Korea. He took advantage of his prestige and constantly issued statements to the press in contradiction to Truman's stated policies. Truman was keen to limit the level of belligerency for geopolitical reasons but MacArthur wanted unrestricted warfare against the Chinese and was willing to use his prestige with the American people to achieve it. Truman ultimately called MacArthur on his inappropriate behavior by firing him, but one cannot help but think that he would have been less confident and less willing to fire a national hero if the conflict between he and MacArthur had occurred prior to 1948, before Truman had successfully run at the top of a presidential ticket.

c. *Powell and Clinton (1992–1993)*

There was a famous meeting during the Bush–Clinton transition in November 1992⁴⁸ when Colin Powell voiced opposition to Clinton's campaign promise to end the discrimination against gays in the military. At the same meeting Powell made it quite clear that if at any time he felt he could not support

⁴⁷ Lawrence James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 283-285. The battle of Omdurman took place in the Sudan during the re-conquest after General Charles Gordon's demise at the hands of the Mahdi.

⁴⁸ Colin Powell, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 563-4.

the administration's policies, he would "retire quietly, without making a fuss" as if the most popular Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since George Marshall could quietly retire early without political ramifications. It was a polite shot over the bow for the new president-elect.

All presidents have their vulnerabilities, and Bill Clinton's biggest one was his poor relationship with the military, one of the most powerful interest groups in Washington. Bill Clinton's susceptibility to blackmail was acute because of his lack of military service, his record of protesting the Vietnam War, and the prevalence of the "stab in the back" myth in American political culture regarding the failed military effort in Southeast Asia. Additionally, Clinton and his aides likely believed Huntington's estimation of a professional soldier.

The poor manner in which junior members of the White House staff treated senior military officers in the opening days of President Clinton's administration has become the stuff of legend. Their underestimation of the political nature of the professional military caused them initially to disregard courtesies vis-à-vis the military that a politician of Bill Clinton's acumen would have been sure to treat other interests in the Beltway. Clinton had failed to recognize the political nature of the military and had a dismal start in Washington because of it. He was a quick study, however, and soon adopted more effective methods of dealing with the politics of the military. Unfortunately, the damage had been done. After his reversal of his pledge to end discrimination against gays in the military, he would be careful not to cross the Pentagon again for fear of political damage. He had been effectively blackmailed on a wide range of issues, the least of which was the issue of gays in the military. Through political pressure, the military had convinced its commander-in-chief that affairs within the military were, at least to some degree, outside of his purview.

B. GHOSTS OF MOLTKE THE ELDER

1. Introduction

Political activity by the military does not end with the initiation of hostilities so civilian leaders must resist popular sentiment that call for military experts to trump civilians who may not have a background in defense. The strains that war

puts on society make the separation into spheres of influence difficult in any system, but most assuredly in democracies when constituencies will question resource allocation and strategy. Such questions are raised because, in the prioritization of resources, there will surely be winners and losers. Political pressure from the bottom up will be brought to bear through opinion polls and elections.

With regard to execution, the civilian leadership will be held responsible for failure or perceived misguided action by the military, so it is vital that they be intimately involved in military decisions made in times of both war and peace. It is through this pluralistic process that civilian control gains its legitimacy and that the military's actions are held in check by the populace. This prevents the military from engaging in actions that society will not support in the long run and engages all of the populace in the choices that are made in its interest. Politically savvy professional soldiers are better-equipped to deal with this process and political realities in the development of their recommendations to civilian authority.

2. The Unequal Dialogue

The idea that the civilians should “stay in their lane” with regard to military affairs is not a new one; it has been prevalent in military organizations throughout modern history. Delineating responsibility between civilian political matters and military matters would be wonderful if possible. It is not. It is understandable that professional soldiers would want separation for clarity's sake and it appears logical that civilians untrained in the art of war would be out of their element while trying to make decisions regarding military conflict. It may seem logical, but it is incorrect.

In recent American history our bad experience in Vietnam and relatively good experience with the first Gulf War have helped to perpetuate a false myth that Colonel G. F. R. Henderson believed when he described Lincoln's experience in the Civil War by praising “the virtues of independent military

command: unfettered control brought success, political subordination failure.”⁴⁹ This is not only a skewed version of Lincoln’s performance as a wartime leader,⁵⁰ but draws a conclusion that cannot stand up to scrutiny.

3. Tactics versus Strategy

It is axiomatic that war is political from beginning to end. “Every war is begun, dominated, and ended by political considerations; without a nation, without a government, without money or credit, without popular enthusiasm which furnishes volunteers, or public support which endures conscription, there could be no army and no war.”⁵¹ Some of the most seemingly menial decisions have wide-ranging political implications during times of war and, therefore, are clearly the domain of the elected politician. War is the politician’s responsibility and we cannot forget that when things go wrong, the politician will be the one to answer for it.

I am not just arguing that the civilian has the right to intervene in war; that is a given. I believe he has an obligation to be thoroughly involved to gauge the wisdom of his subordinates and to remedy problems when they arise or direct how to avoid problems in the first place. Sometimes generals do not see the forest from the trees and will equate tactics with strategy.

a. Bismarck-Moltke (1862–1871)

Moltke the Elder bristled at civilian interference with military affairs and sought to comprise a formula to neatly separate the political from the military. His frustration was born of his encounters with Otto von Bismarck during hostilities against Schleswig-Holstein, Austria and France. Known as the Bismarck-Moltke fights, they serve both as a good example of why soldiers long to be free of civilian interference during the prosecution of hostilities and as an

⁴⁹ Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 4.

⁵⁰ Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command* (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 15-51. Cohen argues that Lincoln was heavily involved in the decision making of the military and was not afraid to overrule them. With regard to Grant, “who Henderson felt had “unfettered command,” Cohen demonstrates how Lincoln kept a close tab on his decisions and his demeanor as well.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 51.

illuminating example of why they should not be. I will look at just one of these disputes, the Düppel dispute, to illustrate how the political master was able to bring an entire spectrum of political considerations into his calculus, while the military professional was more limited in his considerations.

After the Prussian invasion of Denmark but before any decisive Prussian victories, the British proposed a peace conference in London to reconcile the belligerents. Realizing that he needed an immediate impressive display of Prussian arms to dissuade involvement of the Great Powers in the conflict, Bismarck ordered the immediate storming of Düppel. At the time, the Prussian military leadership was preparing for a long siege. The military commander on site favored continued preparation saying that an immediate attack would, “cost a lot of men and money. I don’t see the military necessity.”⁵² Moltke, the chief of staff, backed up the commander on site. After a month of Bismarck’s insistence, the attack proceeded and was a quick success. The victory at Düppel “made it possible for Prussia to participate in the London conference as a power that had proved itself in the field...the French refused to entertain a British proposal for joint pressure on Prussia.”⁵³

Moltke and the military commanders on site were viewing the dispute through their professional lens and clearly did not see the need for an immediate attack, but Bismarck was able to view the mosaic of political and military considerations and arrive at a different conclusion. If a stunning vindication of Prussian arms had not been displayed, the possibility of French and British involvement in the conflict at Prussia’s expense would have increased significantly.

Whether Bismarck was correct in his calculus is not the important point to take away from the Düppel dispute, because there are other cases that can demonstrate poor civilian strategic judgment. Principally we have to remember that if Bismarck was incorrect in his judgment, there would have been

⁵² Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* (New York: The Oxford University Press, 1955), 188.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 190.

dire political, social, economic as well as military consequences, the brunt of which would have been borne by Bismarck in his capacity as Minister President.

b. *The Political Demands of Coalition Warfare*

In a more expanded conflict such as World War II where total victory is the desired end state, these political considerations do not evaporate; they merely shift. Instead of dissuading potential adversaries, the focal point of political maneuvering is to ensure domestic support and to build and maintain coalitions with allies. Regarding trans-Atlantic convoys, Churchill found himself deciding minute, seemingly tactical problems⁵⁴ because of their political nature. “The assumption of risk to Britain’s lifeline to the outer world required a political decision.”⁵⁵

Franklin Delano Roosevelt did not work the politics prior to hostilities and then “turn over” the prosecution of the war to the military. He was deeply involved in balancing the needs and concerns of the U.S. military against those of coalition partners to ensure the cohesion of effort against Germany and to a lesser extent against Japan. Major military decisions that in Moltke’s view⁵⁶ should have been left to the military were adjudicated by FDR. Grand Strategy required a daunting balancing act between keeping Russia in the war, logistical realities, manpower limitations, as well as military considerations. To the layperson, whether or not to invade North Africa would seem to be a purely military decision based on capabilities and sound tactics. In actuality, the

⁵⁴ Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command* (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 10. One example is whether convoys should travel at 10 or 15 knots.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁵⁶ Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* (New York: The Oxford University Press, 1955), 216. Moltke’s view was that “politics uses war for the attainment of its ends; it operates decisively at the beginning and end [of the conflict].”

decision had to weigh suspicions⁵⁷ and psychological estimations⁵⁸ as well as capabilities and sound tactics.

c. *Tactics and Strategy in Iraq*

The competition between military concerns and political concerns has been on display in the conflict in Iraq and gives a present-day example of why political concerns necessarily have to trump tactical military concerns. It is now conventional wisdom after the second battle of Fallujah in November 2004 that the Marines should have been allowed to “finish the job” in April 2004 because they ultimately had to take the city by force anyway; delay simply allowed the insurgents to further dig in and to prepare for the battle. This is surely the vantage point of Marines who lost thirty-nine⁵⁹ comrades in the failed April struggle only to return in November for the final assault. Lt. Gen Conway best summed up this sentiment when he said. “Once you commit, you got to stay committed.”⁶⁰

This line of thought ignores the political developments of the summer of 2004 and of the inherent need for political progress during an insurgency where there can be no military solution, only a political one. The fact remains that if we had “won” the battle for Fallujah in April but had lost the support of hesitant Iraqi political leaders that were working with the United States, it would have been a Pyrrhic victory and could have spelled the beginning of an ignominious withdrawal from a shattered country. You do not have to “stay committed” if that is not what will meet your political goals. All we did in Vietnam

⁵⁷ Mark A. Stoller, *Allies and Adversaries – The Joint Chiefs, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 71. “Embick warned Marshall that London’s entire Mediterranean approach was motivated ‘more largely by political than by sound strategic purposes’” implying that imperial concerns unrelated to the main effort against Germany were driving their pursuit of action in the Mediterranean.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 99. Fear that U.S. inaction in 1943 may have caused Stalin to sign a separate peace with Germany weighed heavily on the decision to invade North Africa.

⁵⁹ Jonathan F. Keiler, “Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, (January 2005).

⁶⁰ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Key General Criticizes April Attack in Fallujah.” *Washington Post*, September 13, 2004.

was “stay committed” without questioning how the tactics would lead to strategic victory. Contrary to popular belief there was too little civilian control in Vietnam, not too much.⁶¹

The summer of 2004 allowed the political landscape of Iraq to change drastically. Insurgent attacks did increase but they contributed to a growing sense among Iraqis that they had had enough, especially since Iraqis themselves seemed to be the prime target of such attacks. Prime Minister Iyad Allawi had taken over as caretaker of the provisional government and had a high-profile role in calling for the second assault on Fallujah, decreasing the sense that Americans were merely avenging the deaths of American contractors at the expense of innocent Iraqis. It appears that the political call to halt the April military assault on Fallujah due to Iraqi politicians’ reservations may have contributed significantly to the legitimization of Iraqi politicians which has proven vital to the series of elections since that time and have finally brought an elected government to power.

d. A Challenge to Civilian Control from Retired Generals

Since late March 2006 several recently retired generals have come out publicly calling for the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Their reasons range from his treating the military with a “contemptuous” attitude to the assertion that he “set the conditions for Abu Ghraib” to the assertion that “we are fighting a 12- to 14-division...national strategy with something far less than that.”⁶² The highly unusual fact that so many retired generals have hit the talk show circuit and editorial pages across the country calling for the firing of the secretary of defense is something Americans should be concerned about, regardless of their political leanings.

⁶¹ Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command* (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 175-184.

⁶² John Batiste (Maj. Gen (ret.), U.S. Army), interview with Bob Shieffer, Washington, D.C., April 23, 2006 and John Batiste (Maj. Gen. (ret.), U.S. Army), interview with Harry Smith, New York, April 12, 2006.

The value of their technical criticisms is not the issue. The preservation of the military as a partisan-neutral organization is.⁶³ Historically, it has not boded well for a country when military professionals have taken upon themselves to choose their civilian leadership.⁶⁴ The general's scope of concern is too limited, and in the case of the United States, the civilian leaders of the military are decided during our elections, not by the recently retired disaffected military leadership.

Each issue that was brought up by the retired officers was on the table for debate during the 2004 election and regardless of recent opinion polls, the electorate chose a Republican Congress and George W. Bush as their president during that election. Although many of their criticisms regarding the prosecution of the war in Iraq may be valid, much evidence suggests that their true ire was aroused by Rumsfeld's dedication to the transformation of the military.⁶⁵ Lt. Gen. (ret.) Michael Delong has disputed charges that Rumsfeld

⁶³ Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt, "Young Officers Join the Debate Over Rumsfeld." *Washington Post*, April 22, 2006. "Young Officers Join the Debate Over Rumsfeld." *Washington Post*, April 22, 2006. Lt. Gen. Gregory S. Newbold's statements in the article are of particular concern. He said: "My sincere view is that the commitment of our forces to this fight was done with a casualness and swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to execute these missions – or bury the results." This is a familiar attempt by military professionals to claim as theirs the exclusive role of security matters. The implication being that only those that have been in the military or have served in combat are equipped to decide on security matters.

⁶⁴ Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army* (New York: The Oxford University Press, 1955), 299-300. "[When the battles of 1914-1915] demonstrated that a definitive victory by Germany was unlikely...this brute fact forced the German government to consider the possibilities of ending the war...when Hindenburg and Ludendorff assumed leadership of the army in 1916, they did not hesitate to make their opposition [to negotiation] known...they were supported by powerful interest groups in the country." In the following years, the military leaders were able to create a 'silent dictatorship', destroying chancellorships at will. They had effectively taken over the government because they convinced powerful interest groups in the country that they were more suited for wartime leadership than the civilian government.

⁶⁵ Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command* (New York: The Free Press, 2002). Eliot Cohen released an updated version of *Supreme Command* in 2003 with an Afterword entitled "Rumsfeld's War."

discarded military advice throughout the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq and believes that the retired generals are most upset by Rumsfeld's "tough management style."⁶⁶

The most significant damage from this affair potentially will fall on the uniformed military and its reputation as a partisan-neutral organization. Many pundits have posited that because the generals are retired, they are free to speak their minds and in fact that it is healthy that they do so because the free flow of information is vital to our society's vitality and strength.⁶⁷ This line of reasoning fails to understand the implications that such behavior has on the uniformed military as an institution when improper channels are used by senior individuals so closely associated with the military. Their *criticism of policy* through appropriate channels is welcome and should be encouraged. Publicly calling for the dislocation of their civilian leadership because they have deemed him unfit to serve is quite another.

We do not want to create a situation whereby policymakers start selecting military leaders based on their perceived political leanings. Cynical observers may say that happens now, but real potential for abuse exists unless professional military officers demand discretion from their peers even after retirement.

As retired officers move into other professional endeavors, this becomes less of an issue. Wesley Clark broke absolutely no standards of behavior by calling for the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld in spite of the fact that he is a retired general. Since his retirement he has established his own *bona fides* separate from the uniformed military when he campaigned for political office and won democratic support for policies that he advocated. Maj. Gen. (ret.) Batiste had barely taken off his medals when he started beating his chest about the resignation of the Secretary of Defense. This is quite another matter

⁶⁶ Michael DeLong (Lt. Gen. (ret.), U.S.M.C.), interview with Matt Lauer, New York, April 17, 2006. DeLong was Gen. Franks' second in command during 2002-2003 and briefed Secretary Rumsfeld twice a day during that time.

⁶⁷ Frederick W. Kagan, "Let the Generals Speak; It's Not a Problem for Civil-Military Relations." *The Weekly Standard*, May 8, 2006.

because his credibility is too closely tied to an institution that he claims to care for and because that institution could very well suffer the consequences of his actions far into the future.

C. POST-COMMUNIST CHALLENGES

1. Lack of Institutional Constraint

Theories about the political nature of professional soldiers are complex enough in consolidated democracies, so it should be no surprise that post-communist societies in transition to democracy present an even more complicated dynamic. The critical institutions external to the military⁶⁸ that comprise a healthy democratic political system typically are absent or are in such a state of infancy as to limit their effectiveness. The historical narrative of the state will also shape the perception of civil-military relations within officer ranks.

In Poland, “the fact that the Polish army was fully accessible to the Polish party apparatchiks and the Soviet military during the communist era created a strong institutional interest on the part of the Polish military to establish the widest possible autonomy from outside civilian control. Senior Polish officers defined that quest for autonomy in terms of defending the army’s professionalism.”⁶⁹ This was a dangerous but understandable tendency on the part of a military.

Education efforts within the militaries of these new democracies do not have the luxury of allowing their officers to believe in Huntington’s model of the apolitical soldier because the necessary institutions external to the military do not exist to constrain the political activity by the military. Activity by the military pursued under the guise of “the national interest”⁷⁰ is more dangerous when not recognized for what it is – political involvement.

⁶⁸ Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces and Society* (Winter 1996).

⁶⁹ Andrew A. Michta, *The Soldier Citizen – The Politics of the Polish Army After Communism* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 4.

⁷⁰ Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback – The Role of the Military in Politics* (Pall Mall Press: London, 1962), 35. “All armed forces which have become politicized hold...[a] belief: that they have some special and unique identification of the ‘national interest.’”

The institutions and procedures that both employ and constrain the political activity by the military in consolidated democracies are transferable to these new democracies,⁷¹ but it will take time for them to become vibrant and will have to be advocated with a thorough understanding of the historical narrative of the target country in mind. Professional norms must be adapted when officers trained within an authoritarian political system transfer their loyalty to a democracy.⁷²

2. Institutional Development

Mouthing platitudes about civilian control without framing the reasoning within a broad spectrum of democratic institutions and procedures will not be effective. Lessons learned about effective ministerial control, the free press, legislative control and executive authority can be demonstrated through historical analysis of experiences in the West as well as in the target countries. “The goal of achieving democratic political control of the military can be advanced by focusing on specific aspects of the civil-military relationship”⁷³ including the proper role of the military in the political realm and its relationship to the media,⁷⁴ the legislature and the population at large.

Andrew Michta argued that the civil-military relations in post-communist Eastern Europe have evolved into a distinct pattern, as a sort of transitory paradigm combining elements of praetorian militaries with some characteristics of professional militaries in consolidated democracies.⁷⁵ He attributes much of this to the weak institutionalization of democratic political structures. While the weak democratic structures exacerbated weak civilian control of the militaries,

⁷¹ Thomas Bruneau, “Introduction,” in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, eds. Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2006), 3.

⁷² Mary Beth Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries – The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), 2.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 21. “The military must realize that it is responsible for shaping its image within society. Where negative perceptions are valid, the military should work to reform these practices that induce popular skepticism.”

⁷⁵ Andrew A. Michta, *The Soldier Citizen – The Politics of the Polish Army After Communism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 5.

external pressures such as the desire to join NATO have moderated their tendency to achieve complete independence.⁷⁶

a. Ministerial Control

Ministerial control is of prime importance. The diffusion of military authority within the executive branch has been resisted in Western democracies,⁷⁷ and Poland's recent history underscores the vital need for ministerial control within a democracy.⁷⁸ Primarily, it prevents the military from becoming the personal fief of the president or prime minister; but it also provides the legislature with a mechanism for more effective oversight.⁷⁹

b. The Duties and Responsibilities of the Legislature

Legislative responsibility is also critical to the democratic civilian control of the military. Within the government, the legislature is often the most susceptible to public opinion and combined with an open and free press are in the position to constrain and guide the direction toward which the military heads. "Democratic accountability is strengthened when policy making receives inputs from all democratically elected officials, not just the executive branch....

⁷⁶ Andrew A. Michta, *The Soldier Citizen – The Politics of the Polish Army After Communism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 9.

⁷⁷ See Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 66. In one such challenge to ministerial control, a commission created after the Boer War to look into accusations made by Wolseley against the Secretary of War recommended in the end that the secretary of state for war should be a soldier, and the king himself should be commander-in-chief.

⁷⁸ See Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door – How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 150. "[T]he problem started with President Lech Walesa. His view of civilian control over the military was simple: he was elected President in a free, open election and since the military reported to him there was civilian control over the military. Walesa...directly cultivated ties with senior officers, thereby undercutting the authority of the Defense Minister he had appointed."

⁷⁹ Mary Beth Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries – The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1999), 16. "Day to day executive control is administered through a ministry of defense accountable to the executive and the parliament."

Although consultations with legislators may be more time-consuming than a policy process dominated by the executive, the end result is usually better (and longer-lasting) policy.”⁸⁰

If military professionals accept the assertion that the legislator will help craft a more effective and long-lasting policy, then it is surely in the military’s interest to participate in the debate. Their cooperation with legislative staffs is as important as their advocacy to the population as a whole. Professional militaries must keep a finger on the pulse of the population through effective interaction with the legislature.

c. *The Military’s Relationship with a Democratic Society*

The military must be sensitive to the reality that it must actively engage society in a healthy way. Military leaders should understand that support for the military is contingent on support from society at large, and therefore skills they develop to deal with the press during good times and bad times are critical to their standing in society. Militaries should welcome press interaction with their forces for many reasons. First, through a skilled and coordinated plan, the military can show how the military is benefiting society in the way it socializes young men and through its civil-works projects. Second, through appropriate information campaigns it can keep society informed of operations it is conducting throughout the country and overseas that help build its relationships with other democracies and economies. Third, the press can serve as a conduit for information flow within the military itself, where, because of its hierarchical nature, information bottlenecks can isolate the top echelons of leadership from the noncoms and junior officers who are executing operations.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Jeanne Kinney Giraldo, “Legislatures and National Defense,” in *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, eds. Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2006), 35.

⁸¹ Robert D. Kaplan, *Imperial Grunts* (New York: Random House, 2005), 262. Kaplan notes that “the press enjoys unique protection under the Constitution because it is an indispensable part of representative democracy. As an indispensable element of the system, I believe that helping different levels of [the military] to communicate with each other [is] quite appropriate.”

D. CONCLUSION

Misconceptions about the political nature of professional soldiers are widespread in both new and consolidated democracies. In the very best of circumstances, professional militaries will compete with other actors in the democratic spectrum to advocate for their interests. The limitation and control of this political behavior is one of the more critical problems faced by liberal democracies. Janowitz and Huntington's reliance on professionalism to constrain the military is surely not sufficient.⁸²

One way to promote healthy democratic civil-military relations is to foster professional norms among the military leadership regarding inappropriate political activity. If military officers understand their symbiotic relationship with the body politic, they will be less likely to circumvent the institutional restraints placed on their activity.

Most importantly, we have to look past the internal mechanism of the military establishment to the broader democratic institutions and procedures of the state for the answer. Stressing these institutions and procedures in our efforts to consolidate newer democracies will go a long way toward achieving healthier civil-military relations and will lead to a more thorough understanding of the political soldier's role in a democracy.

⁸² Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society* (Winter 1996): 13.

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III. POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY

A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

1. The Basis of a Political Role and Legitimacy in Society

In communist Europe from 1945 until 1990, the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA)⁸³ retained a character that differed strongly from that of other communist armed forces. There are several reasons for this, not the least of which is that the Yugoslav regime it served retained a character separate from the Soviet Union or any of its satellite states. In addition to this fact, the Partisan struggle that the National Liberation Army (NLA)⁸⁴ conducted against the Axis powers during World War II served as the founding instrument of communist Yugoslavia⁸⁵ and the relationship between the Army and the Communist Party was centered on this common history. This sense of identity "has mitigated institutional rivalry."⁸⁶

Unlike any of the other communist regimes in Eastern Europe, Josip Broz (Tito) and his men "had not ridden to power on the back of Soviet tanks and did not remain in power thanks to Soviet help."⁸⁷ This fact created a political dynamic involving the armed forces that was unique to Yugoslavia. Political involvement by the military ebbed and flowed over the decades of Tito's rule, but it always maintained a higher political profile than other communist militaries. It can be said that after the Croatian Spring of 1971 no other European communist

⁸³ In Western literature the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) is also referred to as the JNA which is an abbreviation for *Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija*.

⁸⁴ The National Liberation Army was the predecessor to the Yugoslav People's Army.

⁸⁵ A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1978), 1.

⁸⁶ Richard Clinton Herrick, *The Yugoslav People's Army: Its Military and Political Mission* (Monterey: The Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 64.

⁸⁷ Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (USA: Yale University Press, 1998), 142. See also Marco Milivojevic, "The Political Role of the Yugoslav People's Army in Contemporary Yugoslavia," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy*, ed. Marco Milivojević, John B. Allcock and Pierre Maurer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 17.

military, except the Polish military regime that assumed power in 1981, played as integral part in political affairs as the YPA.⁸⁸

This role was not always negative; in fact, throughout most of Yugoslavia's existence after World War II the YPA's political role was constitutional⁸⁹ and it maintained a highly professional outlook regarding its proper place in society and served as a cohesive force in a country beset with ethnic tensions.⁹⁰

The legitimacy of the YPA as an institution also ebbed and flowed over the years between 1945 and 1990 as political events transformed the shape of Yugoslavia's institutions. At times we will see the YPA's relevance in society decrease and during times of regime insecurity it grew.⁹¹

2. Significant Events 1941–1990

Between 1941 and 1990 the YPA went through four major phases. The first phase lasted from 1941 until the late 1950s and included the Partisan struggle during World War II and the Soviet-Yugoslav split. This period was characterized by generally centralized control that focused on the defense of the state by a modern, conventional army. The second phase lasted until the late 60s and was characterized by a lessening of tensions with the Soviets and a refocus of the military on possible threats from the West. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia ushered in the third phase which saw a decentralization of power away from the YPA to more diffuse republican military forces that would better counter a Soviet invasion through tactics perfected by the Partisans in World War II. The fourth and last phase began in the early to middle 1970s as reforms were

⁸⁸ James Gow, "Legitimacy and the Military: Yugoslav Civil-Military Relations and Some Implications for Defense," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy*, ed. Marco Milivojević, John B. Allcock and Pierre Maurer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 60.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 72. In 1986 Colonel General Milan Daljević, Assistant Secretary for Defense and Chairman of the Co-ordinating Committee for All-People's Defense reminded the Thirteenth Congress of the LCY that the YPA's political activity is a constitutional role.

⁹⁰ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 148.

⁹¹ James Gow, "Legitimacy and the Military: Yugoslav Civil-Military Relations and Some Implications for Defense," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy*, ed. Marco Milivojević, John B. Allcock and Pierre Maurer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 93.

enacted to draw power back toward the YPA in reaction to the nationalist Croatian Spring which posed the greatest threat to Yugoslav unity since the state's founding in 1945.⁹² These changes occurred between 1972 and 1980. The result of these reforms was a federal government that was more decentralized to the republics, a military that was more centralized, and a link between the three entities that was confused and indefinite after the death of Tito in 1980.

a. First Phase

Tito and his Partisans prevailed in a bloody struggle in the Balkans between the Germans, Ustashas, two separate Chetnik movements and the Partisans.⁹³ Tito masterfully played down his communist ideology in the fight against the Germans while the other movements steadfastly clung to their Serbian or Croatian blood claims.⁹⁴

After the war, Yugoslavia naturally gravitated toward its ideological cousin, the Soviet Union, and "once the YPA had suppressed the remaining domestic opposition to communist rule, it became preoccupied with external security."⁹⁵ Soon, Tito found a reason to adopt a more hostile stance toward his

⁹² Richard Clinton Herrick, *The Yugoslav People's Army: Its Military and Political Mission* (Monterey: The Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 66.

⁹³ See Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (USA: Yale University Press, 1998), 114-124. The dizzying intrigue that at times made these opposing groups collaborators with the Germans is covered in these pages.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 120. "In Bosnia...the Partisan rallying cry was for a country which was to be 'neither Serbian nor Croatian, nor Moslem, but Serbian and Moslem and Croatian.'"

⁹⁵ A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1978), 4.

former patrons⁹⁶ when “Western support for anti-communist forces in the Greek civil war was said to be a manifestation of the ‘imperialist threat.’”⁹⁷

Tito soon developed a suspicion of Stalin’s intentions, however, and began to resent what he felt was Stalin’s desire to exploit Yugoslavia economically.⁹⁸ He finally opposed Stalin publicly over the independence of the YPA from Soviet control in 1947.⁹⁹ By late spring of 1948, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) was expelled from the Cominform. Soon Western aid would flow back into Tito’s coffers as Yugoslavia dealt with isolation from the Soviets and their allies.¹⁰⁰

b. Second Phase

By the late 1950s, Tito’s Yugoslavia slowly began to relax from its fear of a Soviet invasion. The power between the republics and the federation shifted slightly toward the republics as they gained concessions from the army in matters such as the basing of some troops in their home republics.¹⁰¹ Military

⁹⁶ Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (USA: Yale University Press, 1998), 123. The Allies switched support from a royalist Serbian Chetnik faction to the Partisans when it became clear that Tito held more influence among the Yugoslavs. When confronted with the uncomfortable fact that giving support to Tito would mean supporting ideological allies of the Soviet Union, Churchill said, “...the less you and I worry about the form of Government they set up, the better. That is for them to decide. What interests us is which of [the opposition groups] is doing the most harm to the Germans?”

⁹⁷ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 41.

⁹⁸ Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (USA: Yale University Press, 1998), 141.

⁹⁹ A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1978), 5. This was the first issue in the developing conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. See also Gow, James. *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis*, p. 43. “Whereas the Yugoslavs thought in terms of alliance, the Soviet intention was to subjugate the Yugoslav Army.”

¹⁰⁰ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), 332-4. The provision of economic and military aid to a communist nation was not a universally popular position. McCarthyism was a problem so Acheson favored not a major Yugoslav financial program, but a much more low-profile method of providing aid. He favored encouraging aid from the Marshall Plan authority and the Export Import Bank.

¹⁰¹ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 24.

ties with the Soviet Union resumed and Yugoslavia increasingly began to see larger threats from the West, especially in light of events such as the 1967 Middle East war.¹⁰²

c. Third Phase

The 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet army changed Yugoslavia's outlook as well as the organization of its army. The ease with which the Soviet army had so easily penetrated a small, weaker nation caused the Yugoslavs to reconsider its underlying strategy regarding the defense of the nation. "The principal military lesson of the brutal crushing of the Prague Spring of 1968 was that a relatively small country such as Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia could not realistically expect to defeat a Soviet invasion force in direct battle and using static tactical doctrines, given Soviet superiority in troop numbers, and quantity and quality of equipment, and given the strategic advantage of the element of surprise that accrues to any aggressive attacking force."¹⁰³

The result was the development of the Territorial Defense Force (TDF) in 1968. This new republican-based force was meant to supplement the YPA in the event of foreign invasion. The new force would mobilize as the YPA slowed the initial invasion, then it would revert to an intense in-depth defense with the YPA only to turn to familiar guerilla tactics as an act of last resort.¹⁰⁴ The upshot of this change would be a diffusion of power from the YPA to the republics, as the TDF units would be responsible to republican civilian authorities and would only fall under YPA command when they were involved in joint operations.¹⁰⁵ In many ways, this defense policy was in harmony with the self-management socialism philosophy that had sown discord between Stalin and

¹⁰² A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1978), 7.

¹⁰³ Marco Milivojevic, "The Political Role of the Yugoslav People's Army in Contemporary Yugoslavia," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press), 34.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 34. See also Gow, James. *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis*, p. 45. TDF is also referred to as the General People's Defense (GPD) in some literature.

¹⁰⁵ A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1978), 7.

Tito in the first place;¹⁰⁶ it was very much in line with the trend of the mid to late 1960s of increasing republican control of matters across the spectrum of government.

The relaxation of secret police controls that accompanied the fall of a Serb head of the state security apparatus in 1966 was followed by a general rise in nationalism across Yugoslavia in the following years.¹⁰⁷ In Croatia, the first threatening incident to the unity of Yugoslavia occurred in 1967 when “a group of Croatian writers published a declaration asserting that Croatian was a distinct language from Serbian. The implication was that Serbo-Croatian and attempts to harmonize the languages were really attempts at Serbanizing it.”¹⁰⁸ The ensuing rise in Croatian nationalism came to be known as the Croatian Spring and lasted from 1967 until 1972, but reached its apex in 1971 with the development of a mass nationalist movement that was regarded as the most serious domestic challenge to Tito’s regime in the entire post-war period.¹⁰⁹ The Croatian Communist Party (LCC) was involved in the movement initially to gain economic advantages for Croatia, but soon nationalist organizations began to flourish in the more liberal environment and began to make separatist demands including membership in the United Nations.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 44.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 23. It was discovered that Interior Minister Aleksandar Ranković had been bugging Tito and had been engaged in other repressive matters in general. See also John B. Allcock, Marko Milivojević, John J. Horton, eds., *Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: an Encyclopedia* (Denver: ABC-CLIO, 1998), 62. “The fall of Aleksandar Ranković, the Serb head of the state security apparatus...enabled protests that previously would not have been possible.”

¹⁰⁸ Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (USA: Yale University Press, 1998), 145.

¹⁰⁹ Marco Milivojevic, “The Political Role of the Yugoslav People’s Army in Contemporary Yugoslavia,” in *Yugoslavia’s Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press), 20.

¹¹⁰ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 24.

Tito vacillated initially,¹¹¹ but eventually decided that the only thing that could hold the country together was the suppression of the nationalist movement. Most observers believe that the YPA is the institution that eventually pushed Tito to act. “The army did not intervene openly, but it seems to have been active behind the scenes.” Tito’s subsequent statements indicate that the army had filled the vacuum left by the party’s inability to act.¹¹² Tito’s concept of the role of the military in domestic affairs was clearly being shaped by the instability that nationalism had brought to his regime when he stated that “the [a]rmy played an internal political role...as well as one of external security and would be utilized to suppress a challenge to the integrity of the Yugoslav state if events dictated it.”¹¹³

d. Fourth Phase

The Croatian Spring disturbances increased the power of the YPA because they indicated to Tito the need for greater military participation in domestic affairs.¹¹⁴ Several reforms were enacted immediately following the suppression of Croat nationalism in 1972, but an even greater number of reforms were enshrined in the new constitution of 1974. Not all these reforms drew power from the republics to the federal government. In fact, many favored greater latitude for republics in specific areas, but attempted to strengthen the

¹¹¹ Richard Clinton Herrick, *The Yugoslav People’s Army: Its Military and Political Mission* (Monterey: The Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 79. Tito blamed the LCC of pandering to nationalists and separatists and initially demurred at using the army to solve the problem, telling the League of Croatian Communists (LCC) that it was up to them to put their own house in order.

¹¹² James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 25.

¹¹³ Richard Clinton Herrick, *The Yugoslav People’s Army: Its Military and Political Mission* (Monterey: The Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 67.

¹¹⁴ Marco Milivojevic, “The Political Role of the Yugoslav People’s Army in Contemporary Yugoslavia,” in *Yugoslavia’s Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press), 20. See also Richard Clinton Herrick, *The Yugoslav People’s Army: Its Military and Political Mission* (Monterey: The Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 67. “Tito stated that it was no longer sufficient for the Army to be familiar with solely military affairs but that it must also be familiar with and participate in the social, economic, and political affairs of the country.”

unity of the party.¹¹⁵ Institutions were established that were designed to would take over for Tito after his death. One such institution that would take over Tito's death was the new federal presidency. It was a collective leadership institution¹¹⁶ and it consisted of one representative from each of the six republics and of two autonomous regions, with the chairmanship of the presidency rotating to each member on a yearly basis.¹¹⁷

Tito also began the process of centralizing the control of the TDF, which was finally completed in 1980 with the establishment of the Council for Territorial Defense in 1980. Article II of the 1974 National Defense Law still stated that the TDF was decentralized, but the establishment of the CTD made the TDF a component of the YPA itself, thus completing the centralization.¹¹⁸

In the 1980s, a marked change occurred in the level of military involvement in domestic affairs. Prior to this, YPA members had become more numerically important in domestic politics, but the ambitions of individual military professionals were less clear. They had previously been seen as a generally conservative influence on the government and besides that had confined themselves to military technical tasks. In the 1980s, "the management of the

¹¹⁵ Richard Clinton Herrick, *The Yugoslav People's Army: Its Military and Political Mission* (Monterey: The Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 81. "The compromises...were in favor of a stronger central Party...[a] thoroughly purged LCY which would reassert effective control over the country's political and economic life."

¹¹⁶ Marco Milivojevic, "The Political Role of the Yugoslav People's Army in Contemporary Yugoslavia," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press), 29.

¹¹⁷ See Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of a Catastrophe* (New York: Random House, 1996), 39. One such reform was the rotating federal presidency that was to take over after Tito's death. Ambassador Zimmerman called it "the ludicrously feeble presidency."

¹¹⁸ Marco Milivojevic, "The Political Role of the Yugoslav People's Army in Contemporary Yugoslavia," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press), 36-7. The fact that the CTD was not finally established until just after the death of Tito may have indicated a hesitancy on his part to completely remove the autonomy of the TDF.

economy, social order and the political system increasingly became topics of the generals' critical attention."¹¹⁹

This development owed much to the fact that so many generals had been appointed to positions in the 1970s that traditionally were held by civilians within the party organization.¹²⁰ This increased the vacuum left by Tito after his death. It created an environment whereby the successors to Tito's tradition of Yugoslav unity would feel it natural to fill the void.¹²¹

While there was no doubt that the party was superior to the armed forces, the statutory mandate for this premise was muddled at best and was often quite contradictory. When Tito died in 1980, the post of commander-in-chief died with him. The role should have transferred to the federal presidency, but articles in the constitution contradict, obscuring who is ultimately commanding the armed forces. Article 20 of the 1974 National Defense Law states:

"The supreme commander of the armed forces can transfer the execution of definite actions of commanding and leading the armed forces to the federal secretary for national defense."

¹¹⁹ James Gow, "Legitimacy and the Military: Yugoslav Civil-Military Relations and Some Implications for Defense," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy*, ed. Marco Milivojević, John B. Allcock and Pierre Maurer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 60-61.

¹²⁰ Richard Clinton Herrick, *The Yugoslav People's Army: Its Military and Political Mission* (Monterey: The Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 68-9. A variety of posts were filled during the 1970s including president of a commission in the Party Presidium, Party Secretary of the Army, Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs, one of the Party Executive Committee Secretaries, Public Prosecutor, and head of the Directorate of Civil Aviation.

¹²¹ James Gow, "Legitimacy and the Military: Yugoslav Civil-Military Relations and Some Implications for Defense," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy*, ed. Marco Milivojević, John B. Allcock and Pierre Maurer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 73. See also James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 73. James Gow describes how the basis for the YPA's role in the LCY was its pan-Yugoslav character.

In close contradiction, "Section A of Article 105 of the National Defense Law states that the federation, or the federal government in Belgrade, 'shall organize and prepare the Yugoslav People's Army and shall lead and *command* it.'"¹²²

Ambiguities such as these are not uncommon in statutes, but very little effort was made in the 1980s to actually establish statutory party control over the YPA; after Tito's death, the federal presidency held only nominal control over the YPA, leaving the real power in the hands of the federal secretary for national defense.¹²³ The dysfunctional structure of the federal presidency lent itself to this outcome. Given the nature and structure of the federal government, this may not have been altogether a bad thing. By all accounts the YPA served as a positive and unifying force in the uncertain 1980s when the country's compass was so badly affected by the loss of its charismatic leader. "The YPA act[ed] as a restraining and disciplining device against the worst excesses...of the powerful and centrifugal nationalist forces so evident in Yugoslavia in the...1980s."¹²⁴

In the end, however, the ineffective nature of the federal presidency, a bad economy, and designs by nationalist demagogues conspired to create a crisis for the Yugoslav state that would ultimately prove its undoing.

3. Ethnic Tensions in Society and Its Impact on the YPA

a. Introduction

The Balkans have the unfortunate distinction of being the cross roads between Christian and Muslim Europe as well as Eastern and Western Christianity. "[T]he modern line between the Latin alphabet and the Roman church in the West, and, in the East, the Cyrillic script and the Orthodox church

¹²² Marco Milivojevic, "The Political Role of the Yugoslav People's Army in Contemporary Yugoslavia," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press), 27-29. Other articles place organization of the nation's defense in the Federal Secretariat for National Defense and the Council for National Defense (CND). The CND is controlled by a Party figure, but the day-to-day supervision is the prerogative of the Federal Secretariat for National Defense and his deputy, the YPA Chief of Staff.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 26.

corresponds to the old line separating the Roman from the Byzantine Empire”¹²⁵ and it runs directly through the former Yugoslavia.¹²⁶ This and the fact that the Ottomans have contested this portion of Europe since the 14th century ensured an almost perpetual state of religious and ethnic turmoil.¹²⁷ Even though the Ottomans no longer posed a serious threat to Christian Europe after 1699, northern Bosnia and Serbia were trading hands between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs as late as the early 18th Century.¹²⁸

In more modern times the Balkan Slavs struggled to gain their independence and establish their own state. Of all the southern Slavs, the Croats and Serbs have proved the most formidable of the ethnic groupings and have quarreled for dominance of the Balkans.¹²⁹ In the 20th century, the Serbians gained the upper hand with the establishment of a constitutional monarchy after World War I which was based on a Serbian monarchy, though

¹²⁵ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 3.

¹²⁶ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 4. “[T]he cut-off between Catholicism and Orthodoxy ran through Bosnia.” Even today the use of Latin and Cyrillic carries immense political meaning. When traveling the short distance between the main terminal at the Sarajevo airport and the Peace Support Operations Training Center located at the end of the runway, one passes from Bosniak (Muslim) to Bosnian-Serb territory. There are no longer fences or roadblocks as there were in the past, but you will know you are in Bosnian-Serb territory because the street signs change from Latin script to Cyrillic. See also John B. Allcock, Marko Milivojević, John J. Horton, eds. *Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: an Encyclopedia*. Denver: ABC-CLIO, p. 67. “[T]he public display of signs in Cyrillic (or their suppression) has become one of the most important signals of local ethnic domination.”

¹²⁷ Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity* (Cambridge: The University Press, 1968), 6-12, 56-7. Religious differences existed between the Eastern and Western Roman Empires since the Council of Nicea, but the Great Schism did not occur until the late 11th Century.

¹²⁸ Robert A. Kann, *A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918* (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1974), 65-9. After the failed siege of Vienna in 1683, Belgrade was taken by the Habsburgs in 1688, lost again in 1690, only to be regained in 1716. The Peace of Passarowitz marked the apogee of Habsburg power with the accession of northern Bosnia and Serbia. Both northern Bosnia and northern Serbia would be lost again to the Turks at the Peace of Belgrade in 1739.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 446. “Before the twentieth century, Croat-Serb rivalries and not Serb irredentism had primarily impeded the union movement. The Croats in the Habsburg Empire, a historic national group of long standing endowed with autonomous rights in Hungary, had consistently claimed leadership of Southern Slav national interest. They had considered the orthodox Serbs as a junior, less culturally advanced partner of the nation.”

technically named “The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.”¹³⁰ When faced with Nazi threats, the monarchy capitulated and was overthrown by outraged Serb officers. During the struggle against the Nazis, only the Partisan movement was able to appeal to all southern Slavs because of its pan-nationalist message.¹³¹

b. An Acknowledged Problem

The Yugoslav People’s Army has struggled throughout its history to deal with the ethnic problems associated with the recruitment and training of an army in such an ethnically diverse country with such deep historic ethnic divides. Nationalism has been called the Achilles Heel¹³² of the YPA and the army’s leadership has taken steps over the years to deal with the problem because they understood that questions of ethnic composition cut directly to the issue of the legitimacy of the army across Yugoslavia’s ethnic lines. “[It recognized] the crucial symbolic importance for the functioning of the Yugoslav political system of respect for national affirmation within the YPA.”¹³³

The YPA has tried to maintain an officer corps composed proportionally of the various nations and nationalities.¹³⁴ The plan has not been successful because of the lack of appeal of army life in certain sectors.¹³⁵ Many

¹³⁰ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 6.

¹³¹ Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (USA: Yale University Press, 1998), 120.

¹³² Marco Milivojevic, “The Political Role of the Yugoslav People’s Army in Contemporary Yugoslavia,” in *Yugoslavia’s Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press), 38.

¹³³ A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1978), 20.

¹³⁴ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 54. Besides the civil-military concerns, “[I]t was of practical importance. The defense system, combining regular and territorial elements, needed well-trained fighters from each ethnic group.” See also Johnson, A. Ross. *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch*, p. 20. The Principle of proportional national representation in the officer corps was codified in the 1974 constitution.

¹³⁵ Ibid., 110. Standards for Slovenes and Croats dropped. The YPA even went so far as to bend the rules to try to maintain ethnic proportionality. This effort brought on new problems of disaffection among other national groups.

Croats and Slovenes had other employment prospects that appealed to them more than a prospective career in the military.¹³⁶ This is natural, as Slovenia and Croatia were the most productive regions of the country. There has been success at diversity efforts at the High Command level,¹³⁷ but the lower echelons of the officer corps is still dominated by Serb officers.¹³⁸

c. A Pan-Yugoslav Organization?

The army has always prided itself on the pan-Yugoslav nature of its organization. Its history as a successful resistance movement against the Nazis, Ustashe and Chetniks owes much to the fact that it celebrated the histories of all South Slavs. Tito himself is the product of a mixed marriage.¹³⁹

During his lifetime Tito had always helped paper over the enmity and differences between the varied ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. The governmental institutions he left in place to take over after his death were too dysfunctional to take on the unifying responsibilities that Tito himself had undertaken. The YPA saw itself as the heir to this role, but there are serious questions of legitimacy when an army endeavors to fill such a role in a government that surely belongs with the civil authorities.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, structural problems exist at the federal level that would prevent the army from

¹³⁶ Richard Clinton Herrick, *The Yugoslav People's Army: Its Military and Political Mission* (Monterey: The Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 75-6.

¹³⁷ James Gow, "Legitimacy and the Military: Yugoslav Civil-Military Relations and Some Implications for Defense," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy*, ed. Marco Milivojević, John B. Allcock and Pierre Maurer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 77. "[I]n the High Command [in 1979, there were] 38 percent Croats, 33 percent Serbs and 8.3 percent Slovenes."

¹³⁸ Marco Milivojevic, "The Political Role of the Yugoslav People's Army in Contemporary Yugoslavia," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press), 38.

¹³⁹ Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: Penguin, 1997), 28. Josip Broz (Tito) was half-Slovene and half-Croat.

¹⁴⁰ Richard Clinton Herrick, *The Yugoslav People's Army: Its Military and Political Mission* (Monterey: The Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 101.

wielding enough influence among the eight representatives on the federal presidency to achieve adequate unity.¹⁴¹

B. IMPACT OF EVENTS AND ETHNICITY ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

1. Introduction

It is important to remember while studying the civil-military relations of the former Yugoslav state that it possessed an entirely different dynamic than do our familiar democratic institutions today. In spite of the fact that Yugoslavian politics and civil-military relations were more complex at times than most other communist societies,¹⁴² it by no means possessed the symbiotic relationship that exists in democratic countries between policymakers (comprising of the executive and legislature), the public, the press and the military. At times, civil-military tensions did manifest themselves, but prior to Tito's death these tensions were derived from interest groups trying to sway the decisions of one man: Tito.

After Tito's death we saw the federal Yugoslav government was in disarray while it grappled with changing federal and republican roles. It is useful, however, to examine the impact that events over the lifespan of the Yugoslav state had on civil-military relations so that we may derive lessons by observing the cultural and societal tensions that exist in a Balkan multi-cultural society. The military in Bosnia today deals with many of the same issues that the Yugoslav People's Army dealt with because it is composed of three major ethnic groups and they share old historical tensions as well as the fresh wounds of the recent conflict in the 1990s.

¹⁴¹ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 75. "The force of its pan-Yugoslav position had been weakened by the fissive tendencies of the Yugoslav Federal order. The YPA represented 'Yugoslavism' as eight other units represented partial interests."

¹⁴² James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 48. One example is that during the economic reforms of the mid-1960s, the budget of the YPA was questioned for the first time. Civilians in the party were exercising restraint upon the military in conjunction with their wider scope of authority over society in general. In addition, the TDF policy of the late 1960s was adopted against the wishes of the YPA.

2. 1941–1967

Between 1945 and the mid 1960s, the YPA largely concerned itself with what is generally thought of as professional military competencies.¹⁴³ The relative tranquility and prosperity that Yugoslavia experienced during the 1950s and the dominating leader that Tito embodied left little room for the military to play a large part in what was thought of as domestic affairs. The regime's legitimacy was inextricably tied to the NLA's performance against the Nazis in World War II and the YPA was the heir to that tradition. Because of this intertwined sense of identity between the Party and the YPA, institutional rivalries were thwarted.¹⁴⁴

The power of the secret political intelligence service or State Security Administration (UDBa)¹⁴⁵ overshadowed the power of the YPA and in fact much of its activities were directed toward the YPA immediately after the split with the Soviet Union when many high ranking members of the YPA were exposed as Soviet agents.¹⁴⁶

One direct result of the break with the Soviets was the abolishment of the political commissars in military units. Although there had been commissars in the NLA, the concept was borrowed from the Soviets.¹⁴⁷ Their role was strengthened during the search for Cominformists within the military, but the

¹⁴³ Thomas-Durell Young, "Military Professionalism in a Democracy," in *Who Guards the Guards and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations*, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), 19-20. Young describes these professional tasks as "Essential Duties." They are: organization, technological competency, effectiveness, operational planning capabilities, and command ability.

¹⁴⁴ Richard Clinton Herrick, *The Yugoslav People's Army: Its Military and Political Mission* (Monterey: The Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 65.

¹⁴⁵ After 1964 this organization was known as the State Security Service (SDB).

¹⁴⁶ Marco Milivojevic, "The Political Role of the Yugoslav People's Army in Contemporary Yugoslavia," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press), 17. The most significant of these was Arso Jovanović, an ex-YPA Chief of Staff, who was shot while trying to escape to Romania. See also A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1978), 5. "Surfacing of the Stalin-Tito conflict led to several high-level pro-Soviet defections within the military, and these touched off an extensive political search for possible 'Cominformists.'"

¹⁴⁷ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 43-4.

commissars were abolished at the Sixth Party Conference in 1953. The political organs of the YPA were now subordinated to commanders up and down the military hierarchy.¹⁴⁸

Tensions with the Soviets cooled in the 1950s and the military lost stature and resources because of a general feeling of security.¹⁴⁹ By 1968, “Yugoslavia devoted less than 6 percent of [its] national income to defense and the YPA had been reduced to nearly 200,000 men.” One upshot of this loss of influence within society was the active opposition to party policies by some retired officers.¹⁵⁰

Greater autonomy for the republics encouraged what would be unheard of anywhere else in the communist world: the YPA’s budget was questioned.¹⁵¹ The slow-down in economic prosperity and a competition for resources among the republics spawned debate about how much defense was necessary and how that money could be better spent elsewhere. This was quite common in the West, but was not seen anywhere else in communist Eastern Europe. Even though this period of questioning military budgets for guns in favor of butter for the betterment of the society would not last long, it bodes well for the future of Bosnia that such a tradition does exist in the polities comprising the former Yugoslav state. The lowering of barriers between the military and society is an important step in the consolidation of democratic institutions. That the Yugoslavs have already experienced this pressure could go a long way toward meaningful democratic change in Bosnia with regard to control of the military if ethnic differences can be overcome.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1978), 5-6. At the conference the Party was also removed from any direct command role in Yugoslav society.

¹⁴⁹ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 66.

¹⁵⁰ A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1978), 6.

¹⁵¹ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 48.

¹⁵² A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1978), 10.

3. 1967–1990

Against the military's wishes, the entire foundation of the Yugoslav defense structure was changed in the wake of the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia. These changes reduced the YPA to the status of co-equal with the parallel structures of the TDF that were commanded at the republican level.¹⁵³ The rise of nationalistic sentiment and the diffusion of military authority to the republics combined to make this period of time the nadir of the YPA's political involvement and influence.

The Croatian Spring marked a sea change in the domestic role of the military and also eventually caused the transformation of the military structure of the country back to a centralized structure that had only recently devolved to the republics. "Since the events of the Croatian crisis there has been a continuous military input into the political system of Yugoslavia."¹⁵⁴ It is clear that the events in Croatia that culminated in 1971 gave Tito serious pause regarding the extent to which he was willing to devolve military power to the republics, fearing the establishment of republican armies.¹⁵⁵ This did not prevent the continued empowerment of the republics in other areas, such as the rotating presidency, but seemed to indicate that Tito felt increasingly comfortable with giving the YPA a more prominent role in order to head off the dismemberment of the state.

To this end, the YPA was given a litany of posts within the federal government that previously had been held by civilians within the party structure. It is here that we see the line between civilian roles and military roles grossly violated. Up until this time, there had been some level of constraint put on the

¹⁵³ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 47-8. Additionally, the law was changed to make it illegal for any Yugoslav national to invite foreign armed forces into the country. This provision was made as a direct result of the chimera used by Soviets on other occasions when they had been "invited in" by citizens of the victim country.

¹⁵⁴ Richard Clinton Herrick, *The Yugoslav People's Army: Its Military and Political Mission* (Monterey: The Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 82.

¹⁵⁵ Marco Milivojevic, "The Political Role of the Yugoslav People's Army in Contemporary Yugoslavia," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press), 20. "It is important to remember that the suppression of the Croatian mass movement...was actually triggered by the demand for a 'Croatian army' – a clear *de facto* attribute of an independent state."

military regarding its *de jure* involvement in domestic affairs. With the appointment of several senior generals to civilian posts, this is no longer the case.

The army did not just gain positions of power within the domestic governmental structure in the 1970s, but it also gained influence in the party itself. So at a time when the party was purging nationalist members and re-establishing control over governmental structures throughout Yugoslavia,¹⁵⁶ the military was consolidating its position within the party.¹⁵⁷ It is interesting that this transformation of the military's role in domestic politics was done through constitutional means. "[T]he YPA has...become involved in domestic Party-political life, not on its own initiative but at the insistence of Party leaders and Tito himself."¹⁵⁸ "Whilst constitutional order prevail[ed], the YPA's legitimacy as a political actor [was] intact."¹⁵⁹ In this sense, the YPA's domestic political activity was a legitimate role, but this in no way means that it was altogether a good idea. This role was consolidated in the 1980s and we will see that it set the stage for confusion during the crisis of the early 1990s.

The YPA was unequipped institutionally to deal with the events that led to the break-up of Yugoslavia. The complete lack of authority that defined the federal presidency combined with nationalist politicians in almost every republic scrambling to be the first to the ramparts in the defense of their bloodline created an almost unsalvageable situation for the YPA to deal with. That being said, the YPA at times stood its ground against nationalist politicians when they were clearly violating the law. Additionally, we will see that some among the army

¹⁵⁶ Richard Clinton Herrick, *The Yugoslav People's Army: Its Military and Political Mission* (Monterey: The Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 81.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 71. See also James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 25. "[I]n effect, the YPA was taking a leading role within the LCY."

¹⁵⁸ A. Ross Johnson, *The Role of the Military in Communist Yugoslavia: an Historical Sketch* (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1978), 22.

¹⁵⁹ James Gow, "Legitimacy and the Military: Yugoslav Civil-Military Relations and Some Implications for Defense," in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy*, ed. Marco Milivojević, John B. Allcock and Pierre Maurer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 72.

leadership were prescient enough to see that the YPA would have to abandon its loyalty to the party in the interest of bringing Yugoslavia into the new post-communist world intact.¹⁶⁰

C. KADIJEVIĆ– A CASE STUDY IN PROFESSIONALISM AND CIVILIAN CONTROL

1. Introduction

General Veljko Kadijević served as the federal secretary for national defense (defense minister) from 1988 to 1992. Previously, he was the protégé to Admiral Branko Mamula, who was the defense minister during the 1980s and who had taken *de jure* control of the military after Tito's death.¹⁶¹ Kadijević was of mixed Croat and Serb lineage. He is often blamed for the maelstrom that engulfed Croatia and Bosnia after the short war with Slovenia in 1991,¹⁶² but upon closer examination we see a man who was simply unable to envision the best way to proceed to preserve the constitution and Yugoslavia itself during a confusing and unprecedented time. He was clearly unequipped to counter the demagoguery cloaked in legal arguments put forward by nationalist politicians such as Slobodan Milošević.

By the end of the 1980s, there was a serious lack of support for the Yugoslav regime and it manifested itself in a lack of commitment to a united Yugoslavia all across the country. This was mostly due to economic tensions between the republics because of the grave economic crisis that was engulfing

¹⁶⁰ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 143. See also Milivojevic, Marco. "The Political Role of the Yugoslav People's Army in Contemporary Yugoslavia." In *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy*, 27.

¹⁶¹ This is based on some provisions in the Constitution. Other provisions indicated that the federal presidency had control of the armed forces through the minister of defense.

¹⁶² John B. Allcock, Marko Milivojević, and John J. Horton, eds. *Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: an Encyclopedia*. Denver: ABC-CLIO, 1998), 139. See also Branka Magas and Ivo Zanic, *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995* (Portland: The Bosnian Institute, 2001), 7. Stjepan Mesić, the Croatian prime minister at the time and candidate for Croatia's seat on the Federal Presidency, blames the military leadership for the outbreak of hostilities as much as he blames Slobodan Milošević.

the country.¹⁶³ In Slovenia, the Communist Party of Slovenia found itself aligned with the radical youth movement against the YPA in 1988 because of a controversial court martial conducted against a Slovene member of the YPA who had leaked information to a local nationalist publication.¹⁶⁴

This event set off a series of events that drove a wedge between the leadership of Slovenia and Slobodan Milosević, who was the president of Serbia. It is important to note that at this time the federal presidency was split between those aligned with and those opposing Milosević and his specious constitutional claims.

2. Federal or Serbian Authority?

a. Slovenia's Secession

Prior to the ten-day “Phony War” against Slovenia the YPA struggled to defend the Yugoslav republic from the forces of nationalism.¹⁶⁵ Although evidence exists that the leadership of the YPA had Serbian leanings, they valued the multi-ethnic and federal nature of the YPA. The YPA was not privy to Milosević’s plans for the destruction of Yugoslavia;¹⁶⁶ they regarded themselves as guardians of the constitution and the federal nature of Yugoslavia.

¹⁶³ James Gow, “Legitimacy and the Military: Yugoslav Civil-Military Relations and Some Implications for Defense,” in *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy*, ed. Marco Milivojević, John B. Allcock and Pierre Maurer, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 65.

¹⁶⁴ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 78-88. The issues surrounding the trial ranged from republican rights to linguistic rights. The explosive political results of the ham-fisted approach used by the military to prosecute the leaking of material that was not even secret serves as a prime example in the Yugoslav tragedy of the need for military professionals who possess keen political skills. A military professional with savvy political skills would have taken a more conciliatory route and may have diffused the combustible situation.

¹⁶⁵ Branka Magas and Ivo Zanic, *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995* (Portland: The Bosnian Institute, 2001), 9. Yugoslavia has three integrative factors, 1) Tito, 2) League of Communist (LCY) as a multinational party, and 3) the JNA as a multinational army. Once the first two factors were gone, the only institution capable of holding together Yugoslavia was the army.

¹⁶⁶ Prior to the secession of Slovenia from the Yugoslav federation, Milosević had planned to maintain all the territories of Yugoslavia under Serbian domination. When this proved an unattainable goal, he opted to annex all possible territories from Bosnia and Croatia that Serbian interlocutors could obtain. This is commonly referred to as “Milosević’s fallback position.”

The army's desire to prevent the destruction of Yugoslavia and to adhere to its constitutional obligations were clearly in conflict with one another as force was contemplated against the errant republic of Slovenia. Milosević had urged Kadijević to use force against Slovenia to purge the leadership and to prevent them from proposing constitutional changes to allow for more republican authority. Kadijević's vacillation at using force against Slovenia in the autumn of 1989 saved Slovenia from a crackdown resembling that which had taken place in Kosovo and Vojvodina earlier that year. He was constrained by the rule of law regarding the use of force by the Yugoslav People's Army and the need for it to be sanctioned by appropriate authorities in the federation. The Slovenes owe their successful separation from the federation to Kadijević's critical decision in September of 1989 not to intervene with the military in a Kosovo style crackdown.

In September 1989 Slovenia sought to check the growing dominance of Belgrade within the federation by instituting constitutional amendments of its own.¹⁶⁷ Slovenia's leaders were alarmed at Serbia's treatment of the previously independent regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina and feared the three of eight votes on the federal presidency that Belgrade controlled as a result. Slovenia sought to shift a myriad of responsibilities for Slovenia's affairs from the federation to the Republic of Slovenia. This very open challenge to the federal prerogatives of the central government set the stage for Kadijević's critical decision not to send the YPA into Ljubljana.

Borisav Jović, who was Serbia's representative to the federal presidency, Milosević, and Kadijević decided that it would be sufficient to threaten to impose a state of emergency on Slovenia. When that did not dissuade the Slovenes from proceeding with their plans, they turned to the federal constitutional court to rule on whether or not the amendments to Slovenia's constitution would violate the federal constitution. Chief Justice Ivan

¹⁶⁷ In March of 1989 Serbia had adopted constitutional amendments abolishing the independence of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

Kristan, a Slovene, argued that the court could not rule on hypothetical legislation, and the majority of the judges backed his decision.¹⁶⁸

At this point it became clear that only the army could keep Yugoslavia from dissolving. If the federal government no longer retained the ability to collect taxes, to redistribute funds, to authorize army deployments or to authorize a state of emergency then the federal republic would be completely unable to enforce its decisions.

Jović and Milošević turned to Kadijević to authorize the army to step in. At this most critical time, Kadijević did not cave to pressure from the Serbian officials to intervene. This was critical because in this early stage of Slovenia's separation from Belgrade the Slovenes had made few preparations to counter a military crackdown and a determined intervention by the army would have surely been successful and at a relatively low cost. Instead, because of Kadijević's professional concerns about using the YPA in such a way, Slovenia had bought some time to make critical military preparations as well as political headway with the other republics, specifically with Croatia. At the next meeting of the Central Committee, Croatia would back Slovenia for the first time in its efforts to devolve power to the republics.

Almost two years later Belgrade would pull the rug out from under the military during the Ten Day War by withdrawing support for the YPA to hold Yugoslavia together.

In those two years Milošević made a conversion from the pursuit of a Belgrade-dominated Yugoslavia to the pursuit of a Greater Serbia. Milošević would deny Kadijević's goal to implement Plan B which would have authorized a full-scale invasion and the crushing of the Slovene rebellion. Ironically, it was Kadijević who prevented the military from enforcing Belgrade's will in 1989, and

¹⁶⁸ Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: Penguin, 1997), 75.

now that Belgrade's intentions had shifted, it was Belgrade that prevented the military from enforcing the preservation of Yugoslavia in 1991.¹⁶⁹

After the ten-day "Phony War," the YPA's metamorphosis into a Serbian army was accelerated. The YPA's mask of defending Yugoslavia was removed the day the army withdrew from Slovenia.¹⁷⁰ No longer would constitutional limitations and legal precedent for action play into the calculus of those at the helm of the YPA. The YPA encouraged Croatian, Slovenian, Muslim, and Macedonian officers to leave and in this way ensured the transition of the YPA into a Serbian army. This development meant that the army's leaders were increasingly of Serbian heritage.¹⁷¹ In the ensuing conflicts with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, YPA assets would be put to much more dubious use than was ever contemplated against Slovenia. This transformation into a Serbian army is one of the most critical reasons for the outrageous behavior of the YPA after its short war with Slovenia. The gloves had come off and military professionals such as Kadijević could find no cover from Serbian nationalists both in and out of the military.

b. Kadijević, the Role Model

It is clear that Kadijević opposed many of Milošević's more egregious goals and at times showed a reluctance to see Milošević prosper.¹⁷² He refused to use the army in 1989 against Slovenia because the federal presidency had not authorized it. Even his own personal desire to prevent the weakening of the federation did not cause him to bend to Milošević's desires.

¹⁶⁹ Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* (New York: Penguin, 1997), 161.

¹⁷⁰ Branka Magas and Ivo Zanic, *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991-1995* (Portland: The Bosnian Institute, 2001), 7.

¹⁷¹ Tim Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth & the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1998), 179.

¹⁷² James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 143, 87. At an October 1988 conference, "The LC-YPA had sided with the Slovenes and others in opposing the power-plays of the Serb leader Milošević. In doing so, the YPA demonstrated that, contrary to beliefs in some quarters...it was not a crude Serb agency. On the contrary, its 'Yugoslavness' was apparent."

The shift in attitude that occurred when Kadijević took over as minister of defense is striking. As trouble was brewing in Slovenia in the wake of the controversial trial, he announced that the army publication *Narodna Armija* would be published in the other official Yugoslav languages – Macedonian and Slovenian.¹⁷³ This action showed a level of political sophistication and was in stark contrast to the hard line adopted by his predecessor.

In 1987, Marco Milivojević predicted that the YPA would break with the Communist Party if it felt it was in the interest of maintaining the Yugoslav federation.¹⁷⁴ Seeing the unfolding events in the early 1990s, Kadijević showed rare political prescience with some of his statements regarding the future status of the party and its relationship to the army. He said that “although the Communist Party had played a major role in forming the army’s pan-Yugoslav character, especially through the LC-YPA, with the demise of Communism, political organization within the party was no longer tenable.”¹⁷⁵ With this he gave the first signs of his wish to depoliticize the YPA.

c. Kadijević & Political Blunders

Although Kadijević displayed some astute behavior during the crisis of the early 1990s, his blunders were significant and adversely affected the YPA’s professed goal of preserving the federation. His inappropriate dabbling in partisan politics only fueled fears among republican forces across Yugoslavia about the intentions of the Serbian nationalists and YPA.

The biggest mistake Kadijević made was the endorsement of a new political party that undermined the efforts of the federal prime minister, Ante Marković, who was putting together economic reforms designed to align

¹⁷³ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 87. He also announced that signs and notices at military installations would be in Slovenian as well as Serb-Croat and announced programs to encourage officers stationed in Slovenia to learn the Slovenian language.

¹⁷⁴ Marco Milivojevic, “The Political Role of the Yugoslav People’s Army in Contemporary Yugoslavia,” in *Yugoslavia’s Security Dilemmas: Armed Forces, National Defense and Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press), 27.

¹⁷⁵ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 143.

Yugoslavia with the world's new post-Cold War realities. The new party was called the League of Communist-Movement for Yugoslavia (LC-MY) and reasserted communist ideals, as well as the pan-Yugoslav ideals. Although the party was intended to keep Yugoslavia together, these actions by the acting defense minister only served to solidify feelings in the republics that the military had a reinvigorated political profile.¹⁷⁶

Kadijević would continue to work against Marković even though Marković was the only significant figure in the federal presidency who was working for the preservation of the federation. Marković in the end was a tragic figure because he alone had worked to treat Yugoslavia as sick with the cancer of nationalism while others fed that same cancer. He resigned on December 20, 1991 with the war in Croatia and the impending war in Bosnia a direct result of his failures.¹⁷⁷ Kadijević at this point had been working against him for more than a year. Kadijević's dedication to communism had help doom his federation and his army.

Kadijević was clearly outside of his area of expertise while endorsing communism through his support of the new communist party. Because the viability of the Yugoslav state was fundamentally dependent on its economic viability, the military establishment should have been prepared to subjugate their needs to the general welfare of the state.¹⁷⁸ These decisions can only be competently made by the civilian leadership. Although Marković was not democratically elected, it was clearly within his prevue to look after the economic, social and military welfare of his state. Kadijević's prevue should have been much more limited.

¹⁷⁶ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 140.

¹⁷⁷ Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of a Catastrophe* (New York: Random House, 1996), 163-4.

¹⁷⁸ Richard Clinton Herrick, *The Yugoslav People's Army: Its Military and Political Mission* (Monterey: The Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), 102.

3. Conclusion

General Kadijević was in the unenviable role of Defense Minister of a state that was heading toward a catastrophe because of its dysfunctional federal structure and nationalists leaders at both the federal and republican levels that were bent on the destruction of the state.

Kadijević displayed promising signs of restraint at times and in doing so surely prevented unnecessary deaths in Slovenia. He was overcome by events. Once he saw that the destruction of the Yugoslav state as he knew it was inevitable, he was unable to counter the actions of nationalists throughout Yugoslavia. He clearly lacked the political skills necessary to prevent the compromise of YPA men and material to the nationalist designs of Milosević and ex-military leaders such as Admiral Mamula.

His ill-fated forays into partisan politics such as his endorsement of the LC-MY only accelerated the destruction of Yugoslavia by helping to de-legitimize Ante Marković, who was the only man who had the backing of Western sources of capital through the enactment of reforms that would help rescue Yugoslavia from financial ruin. By actively opposing the Prime Minister, Kadijević unwittingly helped Milosević and other nationalist such as Franjo Tudjman in Croatia pull Yugoslavia apart at the seams. Kadijević was not prepared for partisan politics and he should have refrained from acting in that vain. Depoliticization and withdrawal from the political realm would have better served Marković, the YPA, and the Yugoslav state.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ James Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 141. "The YPA's professed aim of encouraging a unified future for Yugoslavs would have been best served by depoliticization and withdrawal from political prominence. The implementation of such a policy was clearly the best way to lend support to Marković in his attempts to preserve Yugoslavia and generate regime legitimization."

IV. CONTEMPORARY BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

A. FROM DAYTON TO THE DEFENSE REFORM COMMISSION OF 2005

1. Introduction

The Dayton Accords were signed in December 1995¹⁸⁰ and established the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a federation, composed of two “entities”: the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. An international administrator called the High Representative of the United Nations was established to oversee the transition to a peaceful and legitimate state. The entire agreement was enforced by the Implementation Force (IFOR), which was eventually replaced by a Stabilization Force (SFOR). In 2004 SFOR turned over its responsibilities to a European Force (EUFOR).¹⁸¹

The Dayton agreements and their implementation have been an unmitigated success. The international soldiers have not suffered any casualties to hostile fire since 1995 and they have succeeded in separating the two hostile camps, thereby preventing any further loss of life. The problem with Dayton is that it calcified a governmental structure that could not be sustained over the long term and it had no provisions for the creation of a viable federal government that could administer the entire country. Because of this structural flaw, the International Commission on the Balkans, after it reviewed the political situation in the Balkans in April of 2005, that “The region is as close to failure as it is too success.”¹⁸²

The need for military reform became more urgent as it became clear that the entity governments were unable to control the assets of their own militaries

¹⁸⁰ A complex series of documents were negotiated at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio from 1-21 November, 1995. Following the ratification by appropriate constitutional or political bodies in the former Yugoslav states, the documents were finally signed in Paris on 14 December.

¹⁸¹ John B. Allcock, Marko Milivojević, John J. Horton, eds., *Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: an Encyclopedia* (Denver: ABC-CLIO, 1998), 70-71.

¹⁸² International Commission of the Balkans. *The Balkans in Europe's Future* (Sofia: Center for Liberal Strategies: April, 2005), 7.

being used for nefarious purposes¹⁸³ and as the aspirations of the Bosnian people began to shift toward integration with Europe and NATO. In order to qualify for the Partnership for Peace¹⁸⁴ and full membership in NATO, serious defense reform had to be initiated to bring the armed forces under better civilian control and to consolidate the entity armies under federal control.

A Defense Reform Commission was formed in 2003 with the task of reviewing possible avenues for reform. Their suggestions were crafted into law and passed all parliamentary procedures in the spring of 2004. A new round of reforms were launched at the insistence of the High Representative after a series of intransigent maneuvers by members of the various entity governments and militaries to resist implementation of reform measures and after it was discovered that members of the military were aiding individuals wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).¹⁸⁵

The Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report urged the further consolidation of military authority under the federal government of Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁸⁶ It also proposed a litany of other reforms to facilitate the country's acceptance into NATO's Partnership for Peace with the ultimate goal being full accession into NATO. These reforms were all passed by the various parliaments and the entity ministries of defense were abolished on January 1, 2006.

2. The Dayton Accords

The Dayton peace agreement ended a brutal three-and-one-half year civil war that pitted the Bosniaks (Muslim) and Croats living within the boundaries of

¹⁸³ John Drewienkiewicz, "BiH Security Sector Reform." (n.p., May 2006). One such case involved the sale of military equipment to Iraq by Republika Srpska military authorities in violation of the United Nations embargo.

¹⁸⁴ *NATO Handbook* (NATO Office of Information and Press: Brussels, 2001), 68. Two main goals of the Partnership for Peace are "to facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes" and "to ensure democratic control of defense forces."

¹⁸⁵ *AFBIH: A Single Military Force for the 21st Century – Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report*. Sarajevo: n.p., September 2005, 181.

¹⁸⁶ The Defense Reform Commission of 2003 had urged that operational control be placed at the federal level, but kept entity authority over administration and training.

Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Bosnian Serbs. The agreement successfully established the peace, but was considerably less successful at creating a viable state in the conflict's aftermath. Dayton created two entities, the Bosniak-Croat Federation (Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the Republika Srpska. The federal government's powers were kept weak, with most governing functions being maintained at the entity level.¹⁸⁷

The agreement itself consisted of eleven Articles and twelve Annexes that covered the separation of the warring parties, the demarcation of agreed borders, and a constitution for Bosnia-Herzegovina, among other items.¹⁸⁸ The entities were separated by an Inter Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) that, once established, resembled an international border complete with check points and changing script on road signs as a traveler passes from one entity to the other.¹⁸⁹

"The accord created 13 overlapping constitutions (for the 10 cantons of the Muslim-Croat federation, two entities and the central government), as well as reams of laws and regulations that have made the country a bureaucratic nightmare."¹⁹⁰ At the federal level, it created a prime minister, a Council of Ministers, a bicameral state Parliament and a three-member presidency. As dysfunctional as the tripartite presidency is, negotiators at Dayton had to fight with the leaders of the three warring factions to pare it down from their expectations of nine to seven presidents.¹⁹¹

Most observers agree that Dayton was a great achievement in that it ended the war and laid the foundation for consolidating the peace but that since the document was derived from war-time circumstances, it cannot ensure

¹⁸⁷ Julie Kim, *CRS Report for Congress (RS22324) – Bosnia: Overview of Issues Ten Years After Dayton*. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 9, 2006), 1.

¹⁸⁸ *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina* found at: <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/dayton/52577.htm>.

¹⁸⁹ The Republika Srpska utilizes Cyrillic script, while the Federation uses Latin script.

¹⁹⁰ Laura Silber, "Dayton, 10 Years After," *The New York Times*, November 21, 2005.

¹⁹¹ Richard Holbrooke, State Department Briefing at the U.S. Institute for Peace (Speech, Washington, D.C., November 21, 2005). "President Izetbegovic wanted nine presidents, and Milosevic and Tudjman wanted seven. This is the traditional Yugoslav model...a weak presidency, in which people can play their own little games for private gain."

Bosnia's future as a democratic state.¹⁹² Over the past year, the United States has joined the growing chorus of international actors urging for the modernization of the Dayton Accords.¹⁹³

3. Security Sector Reform

Richard Holbrooke thought the biggest flaw in the Dayton Peace Accords was that it permitted the existence of two opposing armies in one country but also recognized that an alternative option to this flawed structure did not exist in 1995.¹⁹⁴ Although a significant reduction in forces did take place in the late 1990s, from 2000–2003 the armed forces of the separate entities still used up a significant portion of GDP and they continued to focus on threats from the other entity's military.¹⁹⁵

Since 2003 Bosnia-Herzegovina has been undergoing security sector reform with the cooperation of the international community and it has proved to be extremely successful. It has come in two phases. The first Defense Reform Commission in 2003 recommended several steps toward the consolidation of authority at the federal level, and the entity parliaments approved the plan to move operational authority to the federal level.¹⁹⁶

In December 2004 the UN High Representative Paddy Ashdown called a press conference stating that Bosnia-Herzegovina has failed to meet its obligations because of actions by the Republika Srpska. The harboring of war criminals such as Ratko Mladic was sighted as the most egregious example, but

¹⁹² Julie Kim, "Bosnia: Overview of Issues Ten Years After Dayton," *Congressional Research Report for Congress* (CRS Order Code RS22324).

¹⁹³ Nicholas Burns, "Beyond Dayton: The Balkans and Euro-Atlantic Integration," (speech, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., November 21, 2005). "[The Dayton Accords] served Bosnia well over the past decade, but they were never meant to be immutable or to be set in stone."

¹⁹⁴ Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), 362. "The most serious flaw in the Dayton Peace Accords was that it left two opposing armies in one country, one for Serbs and one for the Croat-Muslim Federation...creating a single army or disarming BiH was not possible."

¹⁹⁵ John Drewienkiewicz, "BiH Security Sector Reform." (n.p., May 2006), 3.

¹⁹⁶ "Eleventh Hour Reforms" *Balkan Reconstruction Project*. December 1, 2003. Found at: <http://www.tol.cz/look/BRR/article.tpl?IdLanguage=1&IdPublication=9&NrIssue=1&NrSection=1&NrArticle=11140>

he also noted other roadblocks the Republika Srpska was erecting to stifle the reform necessary for European and NATO integration.¹⁹⁷ He recommended that NATO not consider Bosnia-Herzegovina for PfP participation until they fully cooperated with the ICTY and he also called for a more comprehensive round of defense reforms.

The members of the Defense Reform Commission of 2005 comprised members of the entity governments, the Bosnian federal government and members of the international community. Participation and “buy in” by Bosnian politicians at all levels was critical to ensure that a change in governments would not put the reforms in jeopardy. This “buy in” also fostered a more resilient reform because anything imposed by the international community would surely not have been politically sustainable within Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁹⁸

Their recommendations stressed the need for the creation of a single defense establishment and a single force in Bosnia and Herzegovina under a fully functioning state-level command structure, as well as the restructuring of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina to meet the defense needs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Specifically, this meant developing capabilities that would enhance their ability to participate in collective security with international bodies such as NATO.

The abolition of “entity” defense organizations in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the Republika Srpska would require imaginative structural creativity in order to integrate forces previously aligned against each other into an effective military force whose capabilities would not only enable participation in NATO but would also reflect the values necessary to meet basic NATO requirements.

The Defense Reform Commission recommended the development of a professional service that was drastically smaller than that of the former entity defense organizations, reducing the forces from approximately 60,000 personnel

¹⁹⁷ *AFBIH: A Single Military Force for the 21st Century – Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report*. Sarajevo: n.p., September 2005, 179-184.

¹⁹⁸ John Drewienkiewicz, “BiH Security Sector Reform.” (n.p., May 2006), 6.

to 10,000 personnel. The abolition of a wholly inadequate conscription system that bled valuable resources from the state's coffers while contributing little to the defense needs of the state was seen as a critical step to professionalizing the force. Increasing its capabilities was vital to making them a more valuable member of the greater European defense structure that stressed collective defense over border security.

One of the more ingenious structural changes recommended by the Defense Reform Commission was the adoption of a brigade-based system for the operational chain of command while instituting a regimental system for purely ceremonial and military heritage purposes.¹⁹⁹ A total of nine operational infantry battalions would comprise three multi-ethnic brigades with each brigade being composed of one battalion from each regiment. The regiments would continue to foster pride in military heritage of their respective ethnic group by maintaining a purely ceremonial office dedicated to that regiment and staffed by five or six personnel for these purposes. The regiment would have no operational or administrative authority. They would merely provide the basis of *esprit de corps*, moral and unit cohesion by preserving and developing military heritage and identity.

All operational command would be exercised by the multi-ethnic brigade. This arrangement would have the additional benefit of integrating well into NATO's brigade-based deployment practices. Just as the brigade is the basic formation of NATO armies, so shall it be for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Because the entity defense organizations would have to be abolished, the Defense Reform Commission recommended two chains of command, an operational and an administrative to culminate with the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. An Operational Command and a Support Command were

¹⁹⁹ AFBIH: *A Single Military Force for the 21st Century – Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report*. Sarajevo: n.p., September 2005, 21.

recommended. Both of these commands would report to the chief of the Joint Staff who would report to the minister of defense who would report to the presidency.

The Commission recommended severing the political link between the appointment of the minister of defense and general officers in senior command positions. General officers would instead be appointed by the presidency which was less susceptible to the volatility of parliamentary politics. This recommendation attempted to put a larger barrier between politicians and general officers in charge of operational units. This way a change in the minister of defense would not affect the tenure of senior military officials.

Lastly, the commission requires that both the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska pass legislation abolishing their respective entity defense organizations and transfer all authority to the ministry of defense for Bosnia and Herzegovina, ensuring that they harmonize their respective laws to comply with the law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. For instance, both the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska had to amend laws on civil protection and laws on pension and disability insurance to comply with provisions in the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning these matters. The entities were given six months (after January 2006) to comply with this harmonization.²⁰⁰

The Defense Reform Commission's 2005 Report was published in September 2005. The entity parliaments passed the necessary legislation during the fall and early winter. On January 1, 2006 the first stage of consolidation took place as the entity ministries of defense were abolished.

B. INSTITUTION BUILDING

1. The EU and NATO – Do They Facilitate Democratic Reform?

In *NATO in the New Europe*, Alexandra Gheciu makes the argument that NATO facilitates the establishment of democratic governments by helping to establish a *habitus* of democratic norms that helps to consolidate these new

²⁰⁰ AFBIH: *A Single Military Force for the 21st Century – Defense Reform Commission 2005 Report*. Sarajevo: n.p., September 2005.

democracies through democratic institution building. She argues that although NATO is a supra-national organization, it is able to influence the internal debate in these countries as they struggle to reform their structures and practices to gain acceptance into PfP or NATO. "Far from acting as a mere geostrategic arrangement, NATO has been involved in a broad set of activities aimed at promoting the construction of a kind of liberal state identity in Central and Eastern Europe."²⁰¹

In "Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy," Dan Reiter argues that NATO does not help spread democracy and that the geopolitical risks involved with utilizing a military alliance such as NATO in this way poses more risk than potential reward. He points to the fact that some NATO members flipped between democracy and autocracy during the Cold War and that former communist nations have successfully pursued democratic reform without regard to prospective NATO membership since the Cold War has ended.²⁰²

NATO did make ideological concessions at times during the Cold War, but much of this can be ascribed to making a tactical concession on ideological grounds in order to more firmly secure the strategic high ground for the collective democracies in the alliance.²⁰³ Additionally, it is flawed logic to assume that because nations have successfully pursued democratic reforms without NATO's influence that NATO's influence was not constructive in nations that did receive NATO's help and guidance.

²⁰¹ Alexandra Gheciu, *NATO in the New Europe – The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 2.

²⁰² Dan Reiter, "Why NATO Enlargement Does Not Spread Democracy." *International Security* (April 4, 2001), 41-67.

²⁰³ Alexandra Gheciu, *NATO in the New Europe – The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 39-40. One good example of an ideological concession was the inclusion of Portugal in the original membership of NATO. It was regarded as a vital "stepping-stone country" whose inclusion would prove vital to supply lines in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union. "Even countries previously opposed to the Portuguese accession came to accept the idea that the inclusion of Portugal, even though it was led by Salazar's government, was justified on the grounds that it was vital to the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, and they expressed the hope that it would not undermine the broader goal of liberal community-building embedded in the treaty."

2. Institution Building in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Bosnia-Herzegovina poses a much more difficult developmental problem than many of the other nations in Eastern or Central Europe. In addition to the litany of social and structural shifts involved in a transition from a communist system to that of a democratic and capitalistic society, Bosnia-Herzegovina has the added dimension of having recently fought a brutal civil war. The scars left on the people in the country from such a recent ethnic conflict makes reform efforts much more difficult to enact and implement.

In the defense sector, the United States, EU, NATO, and the OSCE have been involved in reform efforts since 1996 and have achieved a higher degree of success than in political reform and consolidation.²⁰⁴ The carrot of accession into NATO or PfP has proved to be the driving force behind the successful reform efforts in the defense sector.²⁰⁵

a. General Officer's Seminar

The Center for Civil Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, ran a three-part seminar between September 2005 and April 2006 for all thirteen Bosnian general officers, as well as several senior prospective general officers from the ranks of the brigadiers (NATO Grade: OF-5). The senior members of the staff were U.S. Army Gen (ret.) William Crouch²⁰⁶ and U.K Army Maj. Gen. (ret.) Drewienkiewicz.²⁰⁷ They have both been heavily involved in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina since

²⁰⁴ John Drewienkiewicz (Maj. Gen (ret.), U.K. Army), interview by author, Monterey, CA, May 23, 2006.

²⁰⁵ Sifet Podžić (Lt. Gen., Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina). In Maj. Gen. Podžić's closing comments at a seminar for Bosnia's general officers on January 25, 2006 he stated that the military's most important mission is to gain membership in PfP and eventually gain full membership in NATO. This reflected a decision by the Tri-Presidency that Bosnia should make itself a viable candidate for full NATO membership, rather than confining itself to membership in just PfP.

²⁰⁶ General Crouch took command of IFOR in November of 1996 which was later designated SFOR in December of 1996.

²⁰⁷ Maj. Gen. Drewienkiewicz was Gen. Crouch's chief of staff during his tour as commander of IFOR and SFOR. Maj. Gen. Drewienkiewicz has since worked as the Director of the OSCE's Department of Security Cooperation Director and Deputy of the international Co-chairman of the Defense Reform Committee.

1996 and are well known by all the major actors in Bosnia. Also among the staff were several retired U.S. colonels and academics with a varied skill sets who were serving as instructors for subjects ranging from ethics to public relations.²⁰⁸

Each period of instruction emphasized important aspects of professionalism in a democracy and stressed the importance of executing the policy directives of their civilian leadership. Gen. Crouch would interject from time to time during the instruction to make important points regarding civil-military relations at the most senior level.²⁰⁹ During Col. Tomasovic's instruction on the elements of national power, Gen. Crouch stressed the need for senior military leadership to anticipate political goals set by political leaders in the execution of their military duties.²¹⁰

This underscores the need for the Bosnian military leadership to develop political and communication skills to better keep their parliamentarians and leadership in the executive branch better informed.

Col. Lee Hockman stressed the need for the military to establish an effective public relations campaign. In addition, he stressed the role of the media in a democracy and its critical role in the symbiotic relationship between the military and the population as a whole in a democracy. Lastly he stressed effective techniques for dealing with crisis situations.

At the conclusion of Col. Hockman's lesson, Lt. Gen. Podžić made very clear to the generals in his charge that since the minister of Defense has forbidden any public statements by members of the military to the press there were to be no public relations efforts made.

²⁰⁸ The seminar staff and their area of instruction: Col. (ret.) Bob Tomasovic, USA – National Elements of Power (D.I.M.E.); Col. (ret.) Ed McCarthy, USA – Team Building and Group Dynamics; Col. (ret.) Tom Norton, USA; Col. (ret.) Lee Hockman, USA – Public Relations (Media).

²⁰⁹ Gen. Crouch is especially qualified to make these observations regarding the nexus of senior military professionals and their civilian superiors because Gen. Crouch finished his career in the U.S. Army as its 27th Vice Chief of Staff.

²¹⁰ Gen. Crouch said that because political leaders control the resources, the generals had to ensure that the legislature and their other elected leaders understand their needs. Also, he stressed the importance of being completely forthcoming to their political masters saying, "If I keep them in the dark and then I need their support, I will be in a tight position. If I communicate well, then it can help me."

3. The Importance of Civilian Education in Security Sector Reform

A real dichotomy exists today in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The uniformed military has gone through several years of indoctrination and training in the realm of democratic civil-military relations and their institutional structures should closely mirror those of Western democracies throughout Europe after the Defense Reform Commission's recommendations have been implemented. The level of development of the mid-level bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defense and the Parliament leaves much to be desired and would greatly benefit from a concerted effort like that which has been so successful on the uniformed military side.

It is clear from the discussions held at the general officer's seminars that the military's senior leadership has a good measure of sophistication with regard to democratic civil-military relations. Moreover, senior officials from Western European nations are convinced that the defense reform measures taken recently to integrate the entity militaries will endure because the senior uniformed military genuinely want them to. They are convinced that the way forward is with NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Community and they understand that the alliance is a community of values even more than one of arms.²¹¹ Where their development seems to have fallen short, at least relative to other areas, is in the manner in which they relate to and interact with the society at large.

a. Parliament and the Ministry of Defense

The appropriate channel for interaction with society for the senior leadership of the military is through the Parliament and through appropriate communication of policy to the press.²¹² Unfortunately, there is a very low level of bureaucratic sophistication in both the Ministry of Defense and the

²¹¹ John Drewienkiewicz (Maj. Gen (ret.), U.K. Army), interview by author, Monterey, Calif., May 23, 2006 and William Crouch (Gen. (ret.), U.S. Army), interview by author, Monterey, Calif., 25 May 2006.

²¹² It is important to stress, just as Col. Lee Hockman stressed during his period of instruction on the media, that the military must communicate policy initiatives as directed by their civilian superiors. The military has an obligation to interact intimately with both the Parliament and their superiors in the executive branch.

Parliament²¹³ in large part due to the fact that there has not been the level of international attention and resources devoted to it as there has been toward the uniformed military. This is not a sustainable condition because healthy democratic civil-military relations are dependent on an assertive, ethical, and knowledgeable civilian participation in security affairs at both the Parliament and Ministry of Defense. Without the appropriate training, incompetent or overly politicized staff could cause an unhealthy dynamic between the Parliament and the military or the Ministry of Defense and the military.²¹⁴

b. The Press and Media Relations

The press in Bosnia-Herzegovina bears many of the same institutional challenges as the government in its adaptation to post-communist realities. The civil war added an additional barrier to fair and accurate reporting. Since everything in Bosnia-Herzegovina is demarcated according to ethnic principles, the demarcation applies also to the press.²¹⁵ There is very little reporting of serious issues²¹⁶ and there is little understanding among the members of the press of their critical role in a democratic society to serve as both a conduit for information and as a safeguard against abuses by the government.²¹⁷

²¹³ Senior Department of Defense official, interview by author, Washington, D.C., January 26, 2006. He attributed this to no training for lower Ministry of Defense personnel and that IMET funds were focused on military personnel. In addition, Bosnia's economy is in such poor shape that many of the talented personnel are employed by NGO's because their wages are so much more generous than government jobs. "The women that swab the floors are often lawyers."

²¹⁴ One senior Bosnian general told me that the level of training of mid-level civilians at the Ministry of Defense and the Parliament was one of his greatest concerns because he felt they were not familiar with their appropriate role in a democratic society. This senior general stressed that the Minister of Defense was most certainly his superior, but that overly partisan underlings within the department would abuse their authority at times.

²¹⁵ Topic, Tanja. *Victory of the Boulevard*, 4. Found at: <http://soemz.euv-frankfurt-o.de/mediaee/qpress/articles/pdf/ttopic.pdf#search='victory%20on%20the%20boulevard%20tanja%20topic>

²¹⁶ Ibid., 11. "Little money is set aside for serious work, the approach is poor, bar-room stories become serious newspaper headings with no research at all."

²¹⁷ Lee Hockman (Col (ret.), Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army), interview by author, email, May 9, 2006.

In this environment, the Ministry of Defense and the uniformed military are especially vulnerable to the manipulation of their statements by partisan forces within the press and society at large because there is little to no investigation or verification done. Given these conditions, it is especially important for the civilians within the Ministry of Defense and the uniformed military as an institution be well prepared to present an accurate picture to the public of how their forces are being trained, equipped and led.²¹⁸ At the very least senior commanders should have training that will equip them to deal with the media during crisis events.

As the one truly ethnically integrated institution in Bosnia-Herzegovina today, the military is in a unique position to serve as an example as a functioning and effective multi-ethnic institution. The possibilities are infinite for press releases that stress the multi-ethnic nature of their organization in its day-to-day operations. It is true that these news items will at times be cherry-picked by nationalists on all sides to highlight special treatment or disadvantage in this or that instance,²¹⁹ but this should not dissuade the government from slowly building on the good news coming out of the Ministry of Defense.

The health of the military as an institution is inextricably linked to the health of the federal government of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its ability to successfully remove the distrust and rancor caused by the civil war in the 1990s. It is in the government's interest to educate the civilians in the Ministry of Defense and the uniformed military on how to get those messages out so that all parties will then feel comfortable with their participation in the national

²¹⁸ Lee Hockman (Col (ret.), Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Army), interview by author, email, May 9, 2006. Speaking about his period of instruction on media affairs during the January general officer's seminar, Col. Hockman said, "I was talking about defending the integrity of the institution in a developing political/social realm where public officials, including military, were now accountable to the electorate for their performance and use of national resources."

²¹⁹ One example of partisan use of what should have been a good news story about integration is the pillorying of Lt. Gen. Podzic, who is Muslim, in the Bosniak (Muslim) press when he attended the Republika Srpska's Army Day ceremonies in January. He attended the ceremonies in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in the recently integrated Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but was attacked by many Muslims for doing so. After the event, his daughter was even harassed by university staff in Sarajevo where she attends law school.

dialogue.²²⁰ Highly developed political skills will be important in this endeavor, and their maturation will no doubt take time, but with new attention given to media training for both civilians and the military, a positive force for integration can be given a new profile in the fractured society.²²¹

C. WITHER INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT?

1. Introduction

There has been significant progress made recently toward the integration of the entity governments and the reform of the federal system in Bosnia. In January 2005, Suleman Tihac, the Bosniak representative on the tri-member Presidency, boasted that constitutional reforms designed to “affirm Bosnian-Herzegovinian identity” were underway and that he hoped the reforms would kick off a round of reforms leading to a new constitution in 2010. Leaders of the country’s constituent people have agreed to work to “dismantle the tri-presidency in favor of a single head of state, while boosting the powers of Bosnia’s prime minister and parliamentary speaker.”²²² The leaders of Bosnia’s Serb community stated publicly their unequivocal commitment to the capture, arrest, and transfer of Mladic and Karadzic to The Hague.²²³ Many believe that the tide has turned irrevocably toward reform and integration.²²⁴

Positive events such as these, as well as the successful security sector reform efforts, have made the abolishment of the office of the High

²²⁰ It is especially important to break the military of the communist-era mentality that, as one senior U.S. Department of Defense official put it, “everything military is secret.”

²²¹ In Lt. Gen. Podžić’s closing comments at a seminar for Bosnia’s general officers on January 25, 2006, regarding press relations, “in a divided society it is important to tread lightly. For the transition, I think it is good that we sit tight...this doesn’t mean that it will not change.”

²²² Eric Jansson, “Stability eludes Bosnia 10 years after Dayton,” *Financial Times*, 21 January 2006.

²²³ Conoleezza Rice, (speech, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., November 22, 2005).

²²⁴ Nicolas Burns (Assistant Secretary of State), interview by Robert Siegel, 21 November 2005. “Now they’ve had 10 years of peace. They’ve been able to reflect on the fact that the bigger ambition now has to be ethnic reconciliation...I think most Bosnians are focused on that. They just want to live a normal life, after having gone through that horrible war.”

Representative a possibility in the very near future.²²⁵ Currently it is scheduled to be abolished in October of 2005 after the elections, but realistically the Office of the High Representative will stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina until the summer of 2007²²⁶ and will most likely retain his Bonn Powers until that time.

The Bonn Powers that the High Representative has wielded since 1997²²⁷ have proved critical to jump-starting stalled progress,²²⁸ but many have accused the High Representative of stymieing local political development by imposing change in such an authoritarian manner without local mandates. Regardless, most agree that it is time for the Bosnians to move “from Dayton to Brussels” and for the Europeans to influence reform through a representative from the European Union’s headquarters instead of through an internal executive authority premised on the Dayton Accords.²²⁹

2. Discretion is the Better Part of Valor

The progress toward political integration and transparency has often consisted of two steps forward, one step back. The police reform measures that the Bosnian Serbs agreed to pursue last fall are now stalled due to obstacles

²²⁵ Julie Kim, “Bosnia: Overview of Issues Ten Years After Dayton,” *Congressional Research Report for Congress* (CRS Order Code RS22324), 6.

²²⁶ John Drewienkiewicz (Maj. Gen (ret.), U.K. Army), interview by author, Monterey, Calif., May 23, 2006. “He has said that he will give up the Bonn Powers after the government is formed after the elections in the autumn. In reality, look for him to give those powers up in about a year.”

²²⁷ Julie Kim, “Bosnia: Overview of Issues Ten Years After Dayton,” *Congressional Research Report for Congress* (CRS Order Code RS22324), 5. At the Peace Implementation Council meeting in Bonn in December of 1997, the council extended the High Representative’s mandate to include imposing laws and removing officials.

²²⁸ “Ashdown – British Marine Who Led Bosnia with an Iron Fist,” *Agence France Presse*, December 14, 2005. In June 2004, Ashdown sacked sixty Bosnian Serb officials including the president of the main nationalist Serb Democratic Party and interior minister over suspicions they were part of [a] support network of war crimes suspects at large...And earlier this year, he sacked a Croat member of the presidency, Dragan Covic, due to corruption charges brought against him by the Bosnian state prosecutor.”

²²⁹ “Bosnia Reaching Turning Point with EU Move,” *Agence France Presse*, October 20, 2005. Speaking about the abolishment of the Office of the High Representative, Paddy Ashdown said “this will mark the end point of the era of Dayton and the beginning of the era of Brussels.”

thrown up to block the crucial police reform.²³⁰ On April 26, 2006, Bosnia's Parliament failed to ratify constitutional changes that would be needed in order to join the EU.²³¹

The efforts at political reform are going to be a divisive time in Bosnia when powerful interests in both entities will see their power base erode if reform succeeds. Politicians will see their fiefdoms lose power to the federal government, and nationalists²³² will see their illegal and lucrative rackets under scrutiny from a newly empowered federal police authority. Because of this, political reform will be infinitely more difficult and time consuming than security sector reform and it will require the continued deep involvement of the international community. There are valuable lessons, however, that the international community and reform-minded Bosnians can learn from the successful rounds of defense reform.

a. Consistency and Unity of Effort

Maj. Gen. Drewienkiewicz of the Defense Reform Commission credits consistency and international unity of effort for the success of the security sector reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina.²³³ Pressure and resources should be applied in concert by the United States and the EU for governmental reforms and a serious education campaign should be embarked upon along with these reforms in much the same way that security sector reform was conducted in tandem with educational initiatives. The U.S. should let the EU take the lead on this, while at the same time providing the appropriate assets to aid in its success. The United States and the EU should meet periodically to update priorities and

²³⁰ "Updates from the Balkans," email from Leadership Development and Education for Sustained Peace, May 31, 2006. "High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling criticized Republika Srpska authorities on May 26 for raising a new obstacle to the crucial police reform...They disagree with the draft model of the BiH police forces...which would transfer legislative and budgeting responsibilities in the police sector from the entities to the state."

²³¹ "Please Let Us Join Your Club," *The Economist*, May 4th, 2006.

²³² Holbrooke, Richard (Former Assistant Secretary of State), interview by Neil Conan, November 21, 2005. "It is the thuggish leaders, many of whom are just plain old Mafioso crooks masquerading as nationalists who prevent [reform]."

²³³ John Drewienkiewicz, "BiH Security Sector Reform." (n.p., May 2006).

set their agenda, but then the EU's representative to the Bosnian government should be able to negotiate with full authority on behalf of the Euro-Atlantic community.

This arrangement makes sense for several reasons. First, because the Defense Reform Commission was able to set priorities in training, it greatly contributed to the success of the entire endeavor. During the defense reform efforts, a cacophony of programs were offered from countries all over Europe; but the commission prioritized them and turned many down.²³⁴ No such authority exists today in governmental reform and education. Currently there are in excess of forty-five different programs being pushed by Western governments with no overriding authority to set priorities and goals.²³⁵ Second, a consistent and unified international effort will be able to most effectively apply pressure to the Bosnian government to get serious about greater governmental reform. The EU has a significant carrot to offer in prospective EU membership. Through appropriate coordination with the United States, the EU could also be given the additional asset of a significant stick to use against the Bosnians if they resist appropriate governmental reforms. The United States could use its significant resource allocation to apply this pressure when the EU's representative feels it is necessary.

The United States should accept this approach because the EU has as much of an interest in serious governmental reforms and, more importantly, the EU's priorities so closely mirror those of the United States with regard to governmental reform. The United States would still maintain bi-lateral ties to the military and the Bosnian government as a whole, but it should be made clear that regarding governmental reform, the EU has the lead. It should

²³⁴ James Locher (Chairman, Defense Reform Commission), interview by author, Monterey, Calif., June 5, 2006.

²³⁵ John Drewienkiewicz (Maj. Gen (ret.), U.K. Army), interview by author, Monterey, Calif., May 23, 2006.

be made clear that any intransigence on the Bosnian government's part with regard to the EU's priorities may also cause certain resources from the United States to dry up as well.

b. A Role for NATO and the United States

Recently, Montenegro has voted to secede from Serbia proper, and the Balkans are bracing for the possible independence of Kosovo in the very near future. The prime minister of the Bosnian Serbs has warned that if Kosovo is granted independence it could cause trouble in the Republika Srpska.²³⁶ Maj. Gen. David Leakey, commander of the 7,000-strong European Union military force in Bosnia, has stated that without a sustained military presence in the Balkans, "a cocktail of destabilizing factors could unlock instability."²³⁷

With so many destabilizing events occurring in the next few years and while Bosnia also tries to undertake drastic reform measures, the EU and NATO should not rush to withdraw troops. NATO's continued presence is vital because Bosnian officials often cite the critical role of U.S. leadership in eventually bringing an end to the Bosnian war in 1995, especially in the wake of failed U.N. peacekeeping missions, which were composed largely of European forces.²³⁸

The EU should continue to provide stabilization forces while the limited NATO presence continues to serve as a reassuring factor. The presence of a general officer from the United States who serves in an advisory capacity on defense reform and other matters goes a long way to assure the Bosnian government that the United States remains committed to Bosnia-Herzegovina's success.

²³⁶ "Updates from the Balkans," email from *Leadership Development and Education for Sustained Peace*, May 16, 2006.

²³⁷ "Stability Eludes Bosnia," *Financial Times*, January 21, 2006.

²³⁸ Julie Kim, "Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping," *Congressional Research Service Report for Congress* (CRS Report Order Code RS21774), 6. The NATO force in Bosnia is extremely small and is comprised of approximately 220 U.S. Army personnel and is commanded by a brigadier general.

V. CONCLUSION

A. DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION BUILDING AND THE POLITICAL SOLDIER

1. Primary Question

This thesis questioned the United States and NATO's education efforts in nascent democratic states and the portrayal of the ideal professional soldier's political involvement in the process. The question here arose because of observed confusion within our own society regarding the political involvement of our professional military. The fundamental misunderstanding that exists in American society regarding the proper roles of military professionals and their civilian superiors caused me to question the methods we use to educate professional military personnel in newly democratic states on the proper role of soldiers in a democracy.

The question is an important one because if the estimation of the professional military's political involvement is not accurate then a democracies' ability to check the ambitions and power of our uniformed military will be put in jeopardy. It is easy for a respected military officer to play power politics and claim an apolitical stance because of his status as a non-partisan patriotic servant of the people, all the while advocating positions that are highly political and controversial. In developing states this danger is more acute because of the underdeveloped nature of its democratic institutions, norms and practices.

I had expected to find that our training was focused too heavily on Huntington's model of the apolitical soldier, but I did not. Instead this study found that the Bosnian military officers displayed a thorough academic understanding of where the military fit into a democratic society to include its role in bureaucratic politics.

Their understanding was only academic, however; in practice, the Bosnian military is incapable of interacting with society in a healthy way. This is due to the lack of development of civil society and of the democratic institutions outside of the security sector. Without a more vibrant press that is less ethno-centric and

a more professional bureaucracy in the ministry of defense and the parliament, the military cannot effectively communicate and interact with Bosnian society as a whole in the way that a professional military should interact in a democracy. Without these conduits, the military cannot effectively communicate its professional opinions, and the parliament cannot exercise true oversight.

The efforts of the Defense Reform Commissions have been extremely successful at consolidating the entity militaries under federal control, and at establishing effective security sector structures. The Parliament has oversight authority, but its ability to effectively exercise oversight is hampered by its lack of qualified mid-level bureaucrats and a dysfunctional press that cannot perform its investigative and informational roles so critical in a democracy.

B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Unity of Effort

The international community and reform-minded Bosnians should emulate aspects of the successful security sector reform efforts in their attempts at political reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Political reform will prove to be a much more difficult process because those who stand to lose power as authority passes to federal authorities will employ nationalist demagoguery in their attempts to block it.

Security sector reform was not an easy process, but has been an undeniable success. Consistency and unity of effort proved invaluable in the security sector reform efforts. For political reform to stand a chance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community must stay committed to democratic institution building while Bosnia moves “from Dayton to Brussels.”

The United States and the European Union should consolidate its efforts at governmental reform and the United States should let the EU take the lead. Bi-lateral contacts will still thrive between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the United States, but in the area of political reform the United States should make it clear that the EU represents our position. Our goals for political reform closely mirror the EU’s and the EU has a fundamental interest in successful reform if it is to allow Bosnia-Herzegovina to join its membership. Multiple international

programs and goals would make political reform even more difficult than it has to be. If Bosnian officials understand that U.S. resources and EU resources will dry up if genuine efforts at reform are not made, it will empower reform-minded Bosnian politicians in their political battles with nationalist and organized crime bosses interested in preserving the status quo.

2. Bureaucratic Education

Education efforts with the uniformed military have been extremely successful. These efforts have to be extended to the civilian staffs of the ministry of defense and the parliament. The military will be unable to interact with society properly until an assertive, competent and ethical civil-service emerges in these critical institutions. Educational efforts should focus on the military's role in a democratic society, the role of the parliament, and civilian control of the military. These civilian bureaucrats should also immerse themselves in defense-related matters in order to become specialists who can effectively challenge assertions by the uniformed military.

The High Representative should introduce standards of conduct and education. After the High Representative's office is abolished, the EU and the United States should demand that certain qualifications be met by members of these important bodies. It should also demand the removal of bureaucrats who repeatedly violate ethics or who improperly defy the chain of command in the pursuit of ethnic priorities.

3. The Military and Press Relations

We should continue to stress the symbiotic nature of a democratic society and the importance of the military to interact with the electorate in the pursuit of its defense goals. Although the Minister of Defense has forbidden military members from speaking to the press for the time being, this prohibition cannot last for long. Eventually new guidelines will have to be established allowing for the exchange of information through the press between the military and society. The interaction facilitates policy implementation at the direction of the civilian-elected leadership.

As the uniformed military develops skills and more effectively interacts with the press and the legislature, it can serve as a unifying force in the society. The military has a vested interest in emphasizing its multi-ethnic nature. With that interest in mind, the military can serve as an example for the rest of society, as Bosnia-Herzegovina struggles to heal the deep wounds from the most recent civil war.

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